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No. 78-873 
-11. I 11( I 
,I\BbARD OF EDUCATION ~
CA 2&-t-~ ~/-, , 
Blumenfeld (dj), ~
ns(dj) ~ . 
v. ~~ ~/_J__:I 
CALIFANO F~ ,r T~ 
SUMMARY: This cases pres_en} s S,IJ.!' q 'r.!32-t ti_ •; W~ W 
constitutes a showing of racial discrimination under 2r u .s.c. 
§ 1605(d) and Title VI of the Civ~ c ~ 9~ ~ 
' - ~~*Wffe 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petitioner, the New York d__,~~-=~: ,-.;: ~ ~
City Board of Education, applied f~;1'Tr~<m ~ the ~ 4 
Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-19. 
application survived the competitive process HEW uses to 
J/EW}~ ~ ~- ~ 
~,fkt__~D£-, 0 
E< A-A-~ ~  ~ ~ -~~~~~'y:------...:.::: 
- -c• disburse ESAA funds and a grant of $3.6 million was approved, 
but petitioner was found to be in violation of the Act and 
therefore ineligible for funding. The Act, in pertinent part, 
disqualifies an applicant which has "engaged in discrimination 
based upon race ••• in the hiring, promotion, or assignment 
of employees" 20 u.s.c. 1605(d}(1}(B}. HEW noted that a 
statistical analysis of teacher assignments in the City schools 
indicated that a disproportionate number of minori~y teachers 
@ 
> ~ ' ~ 
were assigned to minority schools, and that proportionately 
fewer minority teachers were assigned to nd nminority schools. 
~ . 
This, in the eyes of HEW, made out a case fo~ discriminatory 
assignments by the school board. The school board argued that 
the disparity was caused by "(1} restrictions on the transfer 
of teachers written into the collective bargaining agreement, 
(2) the desirability of teaching assignments in [the 
nonminority] schools, (3) the unwillingness of many nonminority 
teachers to teach in predominantly minority schools, and (4) 
the unequal distribution of licenses in specific areas." App. 
2. 
26-27. HEW rejected these justifications as irrelevant; the '~~ __:.;.----
~ 
statistical disparity by itself was enough to make out 
discrimination. It offered to consider only evidence that the 
statistics themselves were inaccurate. 
The school board then filed suit in federal court, 
charging that HEW's action was arbitrary, capricious, and 
contrary to law. The district court ruled that HEW was not 
entitled to disregard evidence that the disparity in teacher 






On the other hand, HEW was entitled to disregard the fact that 
the school board itself was not responsible for discrimination 
that resulted in an unequal distribution of teachers; it was 
sufficient if the State or some entity thereof had produced the 
discrimination. The case was remanded to HEW for a 
determination whether discrimination had taken place here. HEW 
then concluded that the school board's explanations were not 
persuasive, and that its failure to distribute teachers more 
evenly on the basis of race constituted a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and ESAA. The district court 
affirmed. 
On appeal, the~ cond Circuit held a violation of ESAA 
had been made out. As part of this violation, HEW was entitled 
to take into account petitioner's violation of Title VI. 
J Neither Title VI nor ESAA required proof of discriminatory 
intent; an unjustified disparate effect was sufficient to 
prove discrimination. The remand to HEW itself was erroneous, 
although not at issue here. 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioner contends that the court below 
erred in its interpretation of Title VI. The court below held 
that discriminatory intent was not an element of a Title VI 
violation, but in Board of Regents v. Bakke five members of 
this Court held that Title VI was coextensive with the 
Constitution and, under Washington v. Davis, purpose is an 
element of any constitutional violation. Since the court below 
held that petitioner violated ESAA by violating Title VI, this 






and Title VI, directed as they both are to the problem of 
racial discrimination in public schools, should be construed 
together, and construed to require a showing of purposeful 
discrimination. Finally, the statistical showing HEW requires 
in order for a school system to qualify for funding is so 
onerous as to give HEW substantial and unreviewable control 
over the governance of such school systems • 
The government argues that the court below did not 
construe Title VI but only ESAA. In construing ESAA, a statute 
setting the standards of eligibility for federal funding, HEW 
had considerable leeway, and the interpretation it has chosen 
is a legitimate one. 
DISCUSSION: v.fhe government is not entirely accurate 
in describing this case as one where Title VI is not at issue. 
Although the court below rested its decision on ESAA, it did 
both statef that Title VI required no showing of purposeful 
discrimination and held that Title VI had been violated here. 
See app. 25. Moreover, it would be odd if ESAA and Title VI, 
both directed to discrimination in education, defined 
. discrimination in different ways. 
Before Bakke, this Court seemed believe that a Title 
VII-type disparate impact standard applied to Title VI as well. 
See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974). Bakke, however, .. 
has undercut that understa ding. See id., at 18 (opinion of 
Powell, J.); id., at 28-29 (opinion of Brennan, J.). The 
opinion of the court below evinces the confusion as to the 
meaning of Title VI which has resulted, and this case might be 
4. 
- -
"") ce an appropriate vehicle to resolve that confusion. 
~ 
• ~
Perhaps more importantly, the opinion of the court 
below left unresolved what kind of showing must be made to 
counteract whatever presumption might arise from statistical 
proof of non-integration. HEW originally took the position 
that nothing could rebut such statistics, and the court below, 
by stating gratuitously that the district court erred in 
ordering a remand, seems to have endorsed that view. This 
position goes well beyond the disparate impact standard of 
Title VII, as it would deny to educational institutions the 
equivalent of a job-relatedness defense. Cf. Furnco 
Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. (1978); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Not only is this 
unfair, but in terms of the purposes of ESAA it is absurd. -----
ESAA funds are intended to assist school systems "to meet the 
special needs incident to the elimination of minority group 
segregation and discrimination among students and faculty in 
elementary- and secondary schools." 20 u.s.c. § 1601(b)(1). 
If, however, school systems whose _structure _ and attendance 
patterns reflect segregation in the immediately surrounding 
community are ineligible, regardless of the efforts of the 
school board to counteract the effects of that · segregation, 
then funds would be withheld from the systems most in need of 
them. 
The interpretation of ESAA and the determination of 
the requirements of Title VI each appear to be certworthy 
questions. The issue seems of sufficient importance to merit 
s. 
- - 6. 
J 
re plenary review now, rather than waiting for conflicts to arise. 
There is a response. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York v. Harris, No. 78-873 
1. ISSUE PRESENTED: Whether the term "discrimination" 
as used by the Emergency School Aid Act means discrimination 
demonstrated solely by statistical evidence of disparate impact. 
2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW. The Emergency School Aid 
Act (ESAA) authorizes the disbursement of funds to educational 
agencies to aid school desegregation. Local school districts 
~ ~ compete on a competi tiv:-:-s:s for - a 1 imi ted amount of funds • 
·~~ - -
• ~ If a local school district survives the competitive ranking of 
applications, it receives funds unless it is deemed ineligible 
under 20 u.s.c. § 1605(d)(1). (In 1978 the relevant sections of 
- - 2. 
-
ESAA were recodified without substantive change. See 20 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3193, 3196 (1978).) The in e 1 i g i bi 1 it y c r i t er i a proscribe -
four types of segregative practices. Subsection B provides that tr} 
~I 
-
no educational agency shall be eligible for assistance under the 
Act if after June 23, 1972 it has 
had in effect any practice, policy, or procedure which 
results in the disproportionate demotion or dismissal 
of instructional or other personnel from minority 
groups in conjunction with desegregation or the 
implmentation of any plan or the conduct of any 
activity described in this section, or otherwise 
engaged in discrimination based upon race, color, or 
n i na origin in tne hiring, promotion, or assignment ........... 
of employees of the agency (or other personnel for whom 
the agency has any administrative responsibility). 
tJ,i,o ESAA does not define the term "discrimination." See 20 U.S.C. § 
~~ 1_ 61 9 • 
. 1:~~ In January, 1977, the Board of Education submitted an 
~r~ application for funding for the 1977-7 8 school year. In April 
HEW officials informed the Board that funding would be approved 
absent the existence of legal impediments. In July, HEW 
~ announced that the Board was ineligible for funding because it 
~ assigned faculty to city schools in contravention of § 
~  1~(8-;.---- --
' ~ demonstr~:_trong .:_orrelati~ between the percentage of 
~ority teachers and the percentage of minority students in a 
HEW's conclusion was based on statistics which 
II 
school, and on an earlier finding of the Office of Civil Rights 
that the City's hiring system violated Title VI. The statistical 





- - 3. 
minority high school students were assigned to schools with 
minority enrollment which exceeded 76%. Conversely, only 30% of 
minority teachers were assigned to high schools where minority 
enrollment was less than 76%. 
The Office of Civil Rights based its Title VI 
conclusion on the disparate impact of the City's two-part hiring 
system. In 1969 the state legislature decentralized the City ..... ----. 
school system by giving substantial authority over elementary 
and junior high schools to Community School Districts ( CSDs). 
At the same time, the state provided an additional channel for 
hirlng teachers. Prior to 1969, all City teachers were hired on 
the basis of their score on a competitive ranked examination. 
When a vacancy opened, the person with the highest score on the 
oldest City examination was offered the position. But in 1969 
the state allowed CSDs to use an alternative method for hiring 
elementary and_.., junior high school teachers for those schools 
whose student body scored in the lower 45% on a City-wide 
reading examination. In lower 45% schools, CSDs were 
authorized to hire persons who either passed, but did not 
necessarily have the highest score on, the City examination or 
who passed a national teachers examination. The numbers of 
mnority teachers in the City school system increased 
after the alternative system was put into dramatically 
operation. The Office of Civil Rights found the dual hiring 




- - 4. 
teachers from consideration in high schools and in elementary 
and junior high schools whose student bodies scored above 45%. 
ft, 
Subsequent I\ its dee is ion to deny funding, HEW offered 
the Board an opportunity to show cause why the ineligibility 
~J3,) .}o decision should be reversed. HEW did not, however, consider the 
~ Board's evidence in support of its position that no 
~ ,discrimination in fauculty assignment had taken place. 
/3 A~ The Board then sought injunctive relief in district 
R,AI -
~· J)..i IP'(_ J:,,V court alleging that HEW' s decision was arbi tary, capricious and ,. 
~l.1ktv- ,4 ,/i:E w ~ 
/J,,A"I'- illegal, see 5 U.S.C. § 702. The district court rejectedAt'ffl:! -
It 
position that statistics could provide irrebutable proof of 
discrimination. ___,.........__ Instead, the court commanded that before 
declaring a school ineligible for ESAA funds, HEW "must find 
either that ( 1) the school board was maintaining an illegally? b ( 
segregated school system on June 23, 1972 and it took no 
effective steps to desegregate after that date or (2) it had a 
practice after June 23, 1972 that was segregative in intent, 
d e sign or forseeable effect." The district court acknowledged 
that statistical evidence played a role in these determinations, 
but told HEW that contrary evidence could not be ignored. 
Accordingly, the district court remanded the case to HEW. 
At a subsequent administrative hearing the School Board 
justified the distribution of minority teachers in the high 
schools on several grounds: ( 1) State Law. The 1969 changes in 
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over elementary and junior high schools and the addition of an 
alternative hiring method increased the numbers of minority 
teachers in the system. However, the teachers chosen for below 
45% schools tended to be concentrated in schools with minority 
student bodies. Enactment of the alternative hiring channel was 
designed to improve reading performance and allow greater 
community control over schools while increasing minority hiring. 
The Board supported these amendments because it believed that 
minority teachers might provide positive role models in heavily 
minority schools where reading performance lagged. 
( 2) The Asgira,_ decree. - In Aspira v. Board of 
Education, a s tat e co u r t:::--_r-..:::e .... a;L,::u::..;i:..:r:..e;::;::d_,::b..;i:.,;:l;:..;1:;,;· n:.:.!9;z,.::u:.:a:.:l:_...:i:.;n:.:s:..:t~r-=u:.:c:.t:.:.i::..o n. for --------Spanish-speaking students. Compliance with the order created/"/--
heavy concentration of Hispanic teachers in Hispanic schools. ~ 
(3) Collective Bargaining Agreements • A seniority 
.------- __. - _,_ I 
policy incorporated in teacher contracts allowed experienced 
teachers to request transfers to more desirable schools which 
were generally heavily non-minority. Because more senior 
teachers are likely to be non-minority, the transfer policy 
exacerbated the distribution of teachers by race. 
(4) Attrition Rates. ---------- In some schools vacancies seldom occur, while in others, often located in crime-ridden areas, the 
faculty attrition rate is high. Because more newer teachers 
belong to minority groups, more minority teachers are assigned 
to schools with the highest attrition rate. 
-
-
- - 6. 
(5) The Distribution of Teacher Licenses. Teachers are 
licensed to teach in specific subject matters. Because minority 
teachers are concentrated in certain academic areas, the 
distribution of teachers by race has been affected. 
( 6) Al terna ti ve High Schools. Some experimental high 
schools have a high percentage of minority students and a high 
percentage of minority teachers. Comparison of these schools 
with normal high schools is misleading, however, because only 
teachers who volunteer are assigned to the experimental schools. 
(7) Population Shift. The percentage of minority 
students in the City schools has risen steadily. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing exE,_lanations, HEW found 
"'----.~- - ._ 
that the School Board was ineligible for funding under § 
1605(d)(1)(B). HEW found that on and before June 23, 1972, the 
ft&~ 
~ of teachers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI 
~~I'd ESAA. HEW also stated that the School Board took no 
't,f~~ effective steps after June 23, 1972 to desegregate the system, 
~ 0~:~ut maintained a system of illegal treatment of teachers through 
School Board discriminated on a racial basis in the assignment 
P---, . . Y: 
l,M-~ . 
II 
discirminatory practices which were segregative in intent, 
design, or forseeable effect. HEW emphasized the last factor: 
II It is our finding that the assignments of minority, 
particularly black and Hispanic teachers, as well as other 
teachers in your school district could have come about only 
through forseeable acts of discrimination." 
- - 7. 
-
p (1)}?~ 
~ ~ rebut the prima facie case established by statistics. HEW noted 
HEW concluded that the School Board's evidence did not 
~- the argument that alternative schools should not be considered 
~ , _ • along with other schools, but said it failed to explain the ~J-#-'v degree of separation in other schools. Specifically, it pointed 
to ten high schools all of which had less than 38. 8% minority 
-
It 
students and less than 2.4% minority teachers. HEW rejected the 
. ' 
School Board's attempts to explain the correlation of minority 
teachers to students in such schools. First, it reaffirmed the 
conclusion that the dual hiring system discriminated against 
minorities by excluding qualified teachers from the high schools 
and above 45% schools and by channeling minority teachers into 
minority schools. HEW said that these hiring practices could not 
be excused either because they were conducted pursuant to state 
law, or because they were motivated by benevolent objectives 
such as the use of positive role models. Second, HEW said that 
the existence of voluntary collective bargaining agreements may 
not excuse segregation, and that teachers, as agents of school 
aturhorities, may not choose to segregate themselves. 
Accordingly, HEW rejected the Board's ex p lanations based on 
seniority and attrition. Third, HEW said that the concentration 
of minority teachers in certain license areas could not explain 
the amount of segregation present in teacher asignments. Fourth, 
HEW said that the Board had failed to demonstrate how many 
Hispanic teachers were affected by the Aspira decree. Fifth, HEW 
-
- - 8. 
said that demographic changes in the City had no substantial 
effect on the character of faculties. 
~'-~ The district court found that HEW' s conclusion was 
!J f;. ~ -~ ~: upported ~b ~ant ~a:_ ev ide~e • Accord inq l v , 1t qr anted a 
~ • pl• motion to dimiss the complaint. CA2 affirmed on different 
e., ~ ;). grounds. CA2 found that ESAA embodied a congressional intent 
•fl z. 1°J "to permit grant disqualification not only for purposeful 
' ~ . discrimination but also for discrimination evidenced simply by 
 unjustified disparity in staff assignments." CA2 based its 
') ~ holding on two grounds.(!§, ESAA provides~ all guidelines 
• ~ • and criteria be applied uniformly "witho_JU; "regard to the origin 




ESAA proscribes acts and practices that violate Title VI, and 
discrimination may be found under Title VI without proof of 
unlawful~nt. (~· n,"'R;__-u d8~~~-4--~~ 
~ ) ,, 
CA2 upheld HEW's application of a disparate impact 
test:' In so doing, it created some ambiguity about the scope of --
the test. CA2 stated that "the Secretary's denial must be 
affirmed since the data which we have reviewed above clearly 
supports HEW' s determination." If "data" is only statistical 
the statement supports the holding that disparate impact 
(
data, 
.:-;:-ne supports a finding of discrimination. CA2 said that the 
district court's remand to HEW was erroneous, suggesting that 
HEW had no obligation to consider non-statistical evidence. CA2 









justify the racial disparities in staff 
This statement suggests that the Board's 
played some role in the determination of 
3. CONTENTIONS: A. Petitioner. Petr contends that 
Congress intended to adopt the constitutional test for 
discrimination, see Village of Arlington Heights~ Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), when it enacted 
ESM. Petr points first to the language of § 1605(d)(1)(B). 
That section bars funding to school districts where there has 
been "disproportionate demotion or dismissal" of teachers, and 
to any educational agency which has otherwise engaged in 
discrimination in the hiring, promotion, or asssignment of 
teachers. The distinction between the treatment of demotion or 
dismissal, in which a disproportionate fmpact test is clearly 
appropriate, and teacher assigment, which is treated separately, 
forms the basis of petr's contention that Congress did not 
intend assignment practices to be measured solely by their 
racial impact. 
Petr also relies on the legislative history of ESAA to 
support the proposition that Congress intended to use the 
constitutional standard: (1) The Senate Committee report treats 
demotion and dismissal separately from hiring, promotion or 
assignment and states that § 1605 "specifically presumes one 




- - 1 0. 
dismissal" of personnel. S. Rep. 92-61 at 41. The report, thus, 
affirms the conclusion that Congress intended to treat demotion 
and dismissal under a different standard than assignment, 
hiring, or promotion. (2) At the time ESAA was enacted, 
segregation meant de facto segregation. Congress did not intend 
to change the substantive legal definition of segregation. See 
e.g. 116 Cong. Rec. 43140 (Rep. Ashbrook). (3) A colloquy on the 
floor of the House demonstrates that Congress did not intend to 
use numerical balance as the touchstone of descrimination. 
Representative Esch asked if ESAA would require "perfect racial 
balance in the faculty" as a condition for assistance. 
Representative Pucinski, House sponsor of the Act, replied that 
the eligibility requirements "do not require racial balancing of 
faculty and staff in every school." 117 Cong. Rec. 39332. 
Petr challenges CA2's reliance on§ 1602 to support its 
interpretation that ESAA incorporates a disparate impact test. 
Petr says that the language of§ 1602 constitutes only a general 
policy statement in favor of desegregation and not a substantive 
legal standard. Petr supports this interpretation by relying on 
the legislative history of the Stennis Amendment which 
introduced the language of § 1602 in the Senate. § 1602 
provides: 
(a) It is the policy of the United States that 
guidelines and criteria established pursuant to this 
chapter shall be applied uniformly in all regions of 
the United States in dealing with conditions of 
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educational agencies of any States without regard to 
the origin or cause of such segregation. 
(b) It is the policy of the United States that 
guidelines and criteria established pursuant to title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and section 182 of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 
1966 shall be applied uniformly in dealing with 
conditions of segregation by race whether de jure or de 
facto in the schools of the local educational agencies 
of any State without regard to the origin or cause of 
such segregation. 
The inclusion of this language derived from the concern 
of some senators that the burdens of integration were being 
placed solely on the South, with its history of de jure 
segregation, and not on the North, where de facto segregation 
existed. Supporters of the Stennis Ame ndment believed that the 
federal government should move uniformly against all forms of 
segregation. See e.g. 117 Cong. Rec. 11508 (Sen. Stennis); 117 
Cong. Rec. 11 51 1 (Sen. Ribicoff). Petrs also point to 
statements of opponents of the Stennis Amendment to show that 
the language did not redefine the meaning of discrimination. 
The fear that de facto segregation was beyond legal remedy led 
some senators to oppose the Stennis Amendment on the basis that 
it might emasculate all desegregation efforts. See e.g. 117 
Cong. Rec. 11519 (Sen. Mondale). This concern, petr concludes, 
demonstrates that Congress did not believe that it was enacting 




accepts the CA2 conclusion that 
a close relationship between ESAA and 
§ 1602(b) 
Title VI. 
Petr points out, however, that this Court has held that Title VI -
incorporates a constitutional standard of discrimination. See 
-
I 
- - 1 2. 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
--,- -- -- --
287 (1978)(0pinion of Powell, J.); id. at 328 (Opinion of 
Brennan, J. ) • 
Finally, petr argues that HEW incorrectly determined 
that the Board's assignment policies constituted intentional 
segregation. First, HEW's determination was based on its 
conclusion that segregative effects were forseeable, which petr 
alleges is not sufficient to satisfy the constitutional intent 
standard. Second, petr contends that HEW did not prove intent to 
segregate even if forseeability is properly a portion of the 
test. Petr charges that HEW used its statistics to make out a 
prima facie case, then used statistics to demonstrate that an 
effect was forseeable. Such reasoning is no different than 
application of the disparate impact test. Petr argues that HEW's 
charge that the dual hiring program violated Title VI was based 
on statistics alone, so it is similarly invalid. And petr states 
that the alternative evidence it advanced explains the 
statistical correlation between presence of minority students 
and minority teachers. 
~ B. Respondent. At the outset, the SG' s brief notes 
~ & ~several issues it will not discuss. First, the SG argues that 
~,. --~~ ? the correctness of HEW's factual findings will not be in 
I ~contention until this Court enunciates the correct legal 
/).,,~ standard to be applied under ESAA. If it reverses CA2, the SG 
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opportunity to review properly the administrative decision. 
Second, the SG states that the question of the proper standard 
for discrimination under Title VI is not relevant to the 
interpretation of ESAA. The sole issue, in the SG' s view, is 
whether Congress intended that ESAA embrace the constitutional 
standard of discrimination. 
The SG relies initially upon the text of§ 1605 which 
covers educational agencies "otherwise engaged in 





that disparate impact on demotion or 
to be discrimination. Therefore, 
discrimination means disparate impact. 
The SG also argues that the other three ineligibility 
requirements show that reliance on effect and not intent is the -rule, not the exception, under the ESAA. Subsection A disables 
an educational agency that transferred property to any 
transferee that it knew or should have known was a private 
school without prior determination that the private school was 
not segregated. Subsection C declares ineligible an educational 
agency that had in effect any procedure for the assignment of 
children which results in the separation of minority from non-
minority children for a substantial portion of the school day 
unless the separation results from grouping by ability. 
Subsection D bars an education agency that had in effect any 
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activities in order to bar minority participation. The SG states 
that Subsection A bars educational agencies that act negligently 
as well as those that act intentionally, and Subsection C bars 
pracices that result in separation. Neither would be satisfied 
under an intent standard. Only Subsection D, which bars 
practices "in order to" limit minority participation, is 
consistent with use of an intent standard. 
The SG also relies upon the language of§ 1602(a) which 
states that ESAA shall be applied to segregation "without regard 
to the origin or cause of such segregation," and the legislative 
history behind the Stennis Amendment. The desire behind the 
Stennis Amendment to establish a single nationwide policy of 
desgregation without regard to the de facto/de jure distinction 
strongly suggests a focus on consequences and not on intent. 
j impact test is consistent with the policies of ESM. 
Finally, the SG argues that use of a disproportionate 
It would 
make no sense to give funds to school systems that, although not 
violating the Constitution, were maintaining a segregated 
system. To accomplish the full goal of the program, funds must 
be withheld from educational agencies doing less than might be 
expected to reduce racial isolation. 
C. Amicus Curiae, The Lawyer's Committee For Civil 
Rights. Amicus has filed a brief in support of the SG. Like the 
SG, amicus states that neither the scope of Title VI nor the 
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this case, because CA2' s reference to Title VI was incidental 
and CA2 did not pass on the district court's constitutional 
ruling. 
Amicus argues that the language, legislative history 
and administrative interpretation of ESAA all support the CA2 
standard. The amicus' argument touches several portions of 
legislative history not discussed by the SG. The amicus begins 
with the premise that the Court should be reluctant to interpret 
ESAA to incorporate a constitutional standard because 
application of an intent test will demand greater administrative 
time and resources. Amicus argues that legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress intends to adopt a disproportionate 
impact standard: ( 1 ) The Senate report states that --"disproportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or 
other personnel is considered discriminatory and constitutes per 
se a violation of this provision." S. Rep. 92-61 at 18-19. 
Amicus argues that this language demonstrates that Congress did 
not intend to make a sharp break between demotion and dismissal 
and other practices. ( 2) The Senate report states that 
educational agencies are barred from funding if they "cause to 
exist or permit to exist" activites proscribed by Subsections A-
D. Amicus says that the language "permit to exist" cannot be 
squared with use of an intent test. 
Amicus also parses the history of Congressional action 
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the Emergency School Assistance Program ( ESAP) which provided 
$75 million for school districts involved in desegregation 
efforts. The intial HEW regulations promulgated under ESAP 
required that school districts assign teachers so that the ratio 
of minority to non-minority teachers in any school was 
substantially the same as the system-wide ratio. In the fall of 
1970 civil rights groups criticized the use of funds under ESAP, 
charging that money had been given away without adequate civil 
rights protections. Also in the fall of 1970, the House passed 
a version of ESAA, H.R. 19446, that required educational 
agencies to assure the government that teachers "will be hired, 
assigned, promoted, paid, demoted, dismissed or otherwise 
treated without regard to their membership in a minority group 
except that no assignment pursuant to a court order, plan 
approved under title VI •.. , or a plan determined to be 
acceptable by the Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights •.• will be considered as being in violation of this 
subsection." 11 6 Cong. Rec. 4 2225-2 6. The House bill did not 
pass the Senate. 
New legislation was introduced in the 92nd Congress. 
In the spring of 1971, the Senate passed a version of ESAA, S. 
1557, which included the current language of§ 1605(d)(1)(B). 
Senator Mondale, a sponsor of the bill, stated that "[t]here may 
well be many school districts which have desegregated in a 
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standard that we think is necessary and that has been proven to 
be necessary for good, stable, quality integrated education, and 
this proposal is designed to be of help in that area." 117 Cong. 
Rec. 10762. Accordingly, amicus argues that the sponsors of ESAA 
intended to move beyond a constitutional standard. Amicus also 
argues that petr has misconstrued the effect of the Stennis 
Amendment adopted by the Senate at the same time. Senator 
Stennis wanted to establish a nation-wide uniform policy 
concerning desegregation that abolished the de jure/de facto 
distinction. 
In November 1971, the House passed its own version of 
ESAA, H.R. 2266 which contained the current language of § 
1605(d)(1). See 117 Cong. Rec. 38479. In the spring of 1972 the 
Senate adopted an amendment proposed by Sena tor Chiles. The 
amendment altered Subsection A of the ineligibility criteria to 
bar only educational agencies that knew or reasonably should 
have known that they transferred property to private segregated 
schools. ~ 118 Cong. Rec. 5982. The Senate rejected another 
amendment proposed by Senator Chiles that would have exempted 
school districts subject to court orders from additional 
eligibility requirements. The amendment was opposed because it 
would eviscerate Subsection A. See 118 Cong. Rec. 6270 (Sen. 
Mondale); id. at 6271 (Sen. Javits). The Senate passed a version 
of the House measure, and sent it to Conference Commit tee. No 
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made. 
Additionally, amicus attacks petr' s use of the 
Pucinski-Esch coloquy. Amicus points out that a requirement of 
substantial balancing of minority/non-minority teacher ratios 
throughout the system would not require perfect racial balance 
in contravention of that dialogue. In sum, amicus argues that 
the legislative history behind the passage of ESAA supports the 
proposition that Congress intended to adopt a disparate impact 
test rather than the constitutional standard. 
Amicus states that 1978 reauthorization of ESAA further 
supports its view. The House adopted an amendment to ESAA that 
would make it easier for educational agencies to obtain waivers 
of ineligibility because of their failure to satisfy § 
1605(d)(1)(B). The House report noted that "the existence of 
racially-identifiable faculty does not necessarily indicate 
illegal discrimination practices," and proposed that "school 
districts which are undertaking efforts to integrate their 
faculty but which have not yet fully achieved that goal may 
nonetheless obtain a waiver of inel ig ibil i ty." H. Rep. 95-113 7 
at 95. The House proposal was deleted from ESAA by the 
Conference Committee without explanation. See H.R. Rep. 95-1753. 
Amicus urges that this history demonstrates that Congress 
considered HEW's interpretation of the statute, but decided not 
to implement changes. 
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Court decides that ESAA incorporated a constitutional standard 
of discrimination. Amicus states that the Court should 
recognize that the faculty assignment statistics in this case 
form a strong prima facie showing of discrimination which place 
the burden on petr to rebut the presumption by clear and 
convincing evidence. Amicus suggests that two different 
standards for finding intentional discrimination cases have 
evolved. In hiring cases, a prima facie case is rebutted if a 
reasonable justification is offered as the basis for the 
employment decision. See e . g. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
--- -- -------- ___ _..._ _ -- ----
246 (1976). In contrast, the Court in jury discrimination cases 
has rejected the view that assertions of neutrality in operation 
of a selection system will rebut a prima facie case. See 
Castaneda v.Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497-99 (1977). Amicus 
suggests the distinction rests on the susceptibility of the 
judicial process to abuse. Unlike hiring, the assignment of 
teachers is peculiarly within the control of the local school 
system. If a neutral school policy was sufficient to rebut a 
prima facie case, then plaintiffs would be forced to attempt to 
recreate the workings of the asignment process. Therefore the 
burden of persuasion sould be shifted to the school board once a 
prima facie case is made out. 
4. ANALYSIS. This case presents a straightforward 
question of statutory inteprtation: Did Congress intent to adopt 
a constitutional standard of discrimination in 20 U.S.C. § 
, 
,I 
- - 20. 
-
1605(d)(1) (B)? Neither the SG nor amicus adopt the CA2 argument -- - - ~ 
~ th.'.' t Ti':.:.: .::'!.....'.'..mploys ':.. ~rat"... '._'."~ct analy:'.!s, and they are 
~. correct ~~esolution o~ that issue, already laid to rest in 
Bakke, is not determinative of the present case. 
CL,-~ The starting point for statutory construction is the 






treats dismissal and demotion separately from hiring, promotion, 
k-> .. 
and assignment. Although use of the words "otherwise engaged in - ~-----
discriminiation" clearly shows that all practices proscribed by 
Subsection Bare discriminatory, that phrase does not shed light 
on the substantive content of the term "discrimination." Yet, 
given the bifurcated structure of Subsection B, i~ appears most 
/ 
likely that Congress intended that 
tr~ated dif~tl~ than'~ssignment, 
conclusion may be supported by the 
~ . 
demotion and dismissal be 
"' promotion, or hiring. This 
fact that Subsection B's 
ancestor, H.R. 19446 treated demotion and dismissal together 
with promotion, hiring, or assignment. The fact that subsequent 
versions of the Act explicitly set forth the criteria necessary 
to show discrimination in demotion and dismissal suggests a 
conscious distinction between those forms of job action, on one 
hand, and hiring, promotion, and assignment, on the other. 
I believe that too much emphasis has been put on the 
history of the Stennis Amendment which led to the adoption of§ 
1602 in the Senate. The amendment was proposed and debated in 







- - 21. 
the supporters of the Amendment was the distinction between de 
jure and de facto segregation. At that time in the Spring of 
1971, this Court had not directly faced the constitutional 
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. See e.g. 
Keyes ~ School District No. l, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). More 
importantly, the Court had not begun to formulate the 
constitutional intent standard promulgated in Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and in Village of Arlington Heights 
~ Metropolitan Housing Developement Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
Consequently, it is unrealistic to expect that debate over the 
Stennis Amendment will give very much guidance into the question 
whether Congress preferred to adopt an intent standard. 
Certainly, the Amendment was designed to ensure that a uniform 
standard was applied to northern and southern communities; but 
that is accomplished by application of the intent test to all 
school districts. Finally, insofar as§ 1602 appears to adopt a 
substantive legal rule, it apparently intends to employ the same 
legal standard as used - -------- - in Title VI. Compare § . --- 1602(a) with § 1602(b). In Bakke this Court determined that Title VI 
~ ~ 
~~ / incorporates use of the constitutional standard. 
i.-- ~ /J~J. I do not believe that the SG' s other arguments 
-"'~' - · 
~-L~L convincingly demonstrate that Congress intended to 
~~~-
- disparate impact standard. employ varying standards. The four ineligibility 
adopt a 
criteria 
Subsection A uses a knowing or should 
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certainly demands more than simply a showing of impact. 
Subsection C emphasizes "results", and Subsecion D focuses on 
intent. It is impossible to divine from these different 
sections a common principle that leads inexorably to the proper 
result in this case. 
Additionally, the SG argues that use of an intent 
standard would frustrate the purpose of ESAA to fund "agencies 
doing less than reasonably might be expected to reduce racial 
isolation, whatever its cause." It seems equally absurd to deny 
funds to school districts that suffer segregation for reasons 
beyond their control, yet that is the consequence of any 
divergence between application of the intent standard and the 
disparate impact test. On the whole, I believe that use of the 
constitutional standard better isolates educational agencies who 
are doing less than they should to integrate schools. 
The amicus' interpretation of legislative history 
relies largely on materials that either are only tangentially 
related to the intent of the Congress that enacted ESAA or are 
---._____,, 
susceptible to more than one interpretation. For example, civil 
rights groups were critical of ESAP funding that went to school 
districts that engaged in civil rights violations. That 
criticism is not inconsistent with a constitutional standard 
that, as incorporated in§ 1605(d)(1)(B), would bar funding of 
school districts that purposefully assign faculty members on the 
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was intended to encourage school districts to do more than 
required by court decreee. But Senator Mondale's comment was 
made in response to the question whether funds would be 
available to school districts that had already desegregated to 
the satisfication of HEW and the Justice Department. The 
availablity of funding to school districts that wish to move 
beyond compulsory court orders indicates nothing about the 
standard used to declare other educational agencies ineligible. 
The strongest argument made by amicus rests on the 
of the 1978 re-enactment of ESAA. The House quite 
/ 
history 
clearly proposed a change in the waiver of eligibility standard 
to aid schools who had not yet fully integrated their teaching 
staffs. That amendment was rejected by the Conference Committee. 
The most that can be said is that the 1978 actions speak only to 
the Congressional feeling about school districts that are 
concedely ineligible, but they shed no light on the substantive 
standard to be used in determining ineligibility. 
Should the Court dee ide that § 160 5 ( d) ( 1 )( B) adopts a 
constitutional standard for measuring discrimination, then a 
remand would be appropriate. - --.... ......_,__....---.......- CA2 has yet to d_ecide this case 
pursuant to the proper legal standard. Moreover, it appears 
that the "constitutional" standard employed by both the district 
court and HEW on remand allowed forseeability to play too large 
a role in determining intent. In Dayton Board of Education ~ 
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have never held that as a general proposition the forseeability 
of segregative consequences makes out a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination and shifts the burden of producing 
evidence to the defendants •.. ; and even more clearly there is no 
warrant in our cases for holding that such forseeability 
routinely shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendants." In 
the Columbus dissent, which you joined, Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
also criticized reliance on "forseeability" as a sole method of 
demonstrating intent. See Columbus Board of Education~ Penick, 
47 LW 4924, 4940 (1979)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
The constitutional standard employed by the district 
court allowed HEW to find purposeful intent upon a ·showing of a -- ---
practice that "was segregative in intent, design or forseeable 
effect." In its subsequent decision that the School Board was 
ineligible, HEW found both that the Board has discriminated on a 
racial basis before June 23, 1972 and that the Board had 
~ 
maintained illegal discrimination after that date. HEW'S first 
conclusion was based on an OCR determination made in 1976. That 
finding, however, was based solely on statistical evidence and 
did not include a conclusion that discrimination was purposeful. 
HEW's post-1972 conclusion was founded on the "finding that the 
assignments of minority, particularly black and Hispanic 
teachers, as well as other teachers in your school district are 
such that they could have come about only through forseeable 
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therefore, appear to satsify the constitutional standard. 
Accordingly, this case should be remanded to HEW for application 
of the proper constitutional standard. -------------
Ami cus states that once a prima facie case is shown in 
jury cases the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant, 
whereas in employment discrimination cases the defendant bears 
only the burden of showing that the claimed non-racial 
justification was not the real reason for the hiring decision. 
Amicus has suggested that faculty assignment cases be treated 
under the same constitutional standard as jury discimination 
cases instead of under the standard for employment 
discrimination cases. But this Court's recent decisions do not 
demonstrate the existence of a sharp theoretical distinction. 
In Castaneda~ Partida, 430 U.S. at 499, the Court found that a 
combination of statistical evidence and the nature of the grand 
jury selection process created a prima facie case of 
discrimination. The existence of a prima facie case "shifted 
the burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of 
intentional discrimination." 430 U.S. 497-98. After a revi e w of 
the evidence, the Court held that the state had not rebutted the 
prima facie case of discrimination. In light of the state's 
decision to introduce "practically no evidence," the Court, 
however, did not have to explain what, if any, quantum of 
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Similarly, in Washington~ Davis the Court found that 
the District of Columbia had "negated any inference" of 
intentional discrimination, although the Court did not expressly 
explain whether the District of Columbia met its burden of 
persuasion or whether the District simply shifted a burden that 
plaintiffs were unable to rebut. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist has 
stated, "[t]his Court has not precisely defined the manner in 
which discriminatory purpose is to be proved." Columbus Board of 
Education ~ Pennick, 47 LW 4924, 4939 (1979) (Rehnquist, J. 
dissenting with whom Powell, J. joined). 
Additionally, amicus' distinction between jury and 
employment discrimination cases is not convincing. Amicus states 
that assignment of faculty members, unlike hiring, is peculiarly 
within the control of the school system. To retain the burden 
of persuasion on the plaintiff even after a prima facie case had 
been demonstrated would force the party claiming discrimination 
to pierce the veil of governmental action. Amicus fails to 
explain why the motivation behind assignment decisions are more 
difficult for a plaintiff to prove than motivation behind hiring 
decisions. Both decisions are within the control of the school 
system; both are presumably governed by local regulations. 







see generally Keyes ~ School 
189, 227 (1973)(Powell, J., 
concurring), 
distinction. 
amicus has failed to justify the suggested 





MEMO TO - FILE 
78~873 Board of Education · v~ · Harris 
This will summarize (without at all doing Justice) 
the essence, as I understand it, of Jon's fine memo of 
9/15/79. 
The Emergency School Aid Act (the Act) authorizes 
HEW to disburse funds to educational agencies to aid school 
desegregation. A school district (in this case New York 
City) is inelligible if it has engaged in certain segregative 
practices. 
/ 
Sub section B d~ nies eligibility to a school 
district that, since 1972, has: 
~ 
"had in effect any practice policy, or procedure 
which result~ the disproportionate demotion or 
dismissal of 1nstruction_kor other personnel from 
minority groups ••• o~therwise engaqed in 
discrimination based upon race, color, or national 
origin in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of 
employees ••• " (underscoring added). 
-
The Act provides no definition of the term "discrimination". 
The question in this case is the applicable standard in ~ 
determining "discrimination" as used above. 
The contest, as it comes before us, turns on 






in which statistical evidence is controlling and indeed 
irrebuttable, or (ii) the constitutional standards of 
discriminatory intent derived from Davis asnd Arlinqton 
Heights? 
This case has been around the track twice at HEW 
and in the DC, but we are concerned primarily with the 
opinion of CA2. 
2. 
After the District Court remanded the case (on the 
first round) to HEW, it held an administrative hearing at 
which the school board relied on a number of grounds (memo p. 
4-6) that appeared - at least on the surface - to demonstrate 
that the disparate distribution teachers (i.e. high 
percentage of minority teachers concentrated in minority 
schools) resulted from reasons wholly unrelated to any 
discriminatory or segregative intent. HEW (as usual) had 
little difficulty in rejecting these reasons, and concluding 
that the New York School Board was quilty of "discriminatory 
practices which were segregative in intent, design or 
foreseeable effect". HEW p articularly emphasized its 
foreseeability argument. 
The District Court (when the case returned to it) 
found that HEW's conclusion was supported by substantial 
evidence, and dismissed the school board's complaint. 
CA2 affirmed, but on entirely different grounds. 




- -,Q -,I . __ -;;_ ~ef ~~rs [j ~ :",{ 
~ ~~ uu<~ 
~ 
It concluded that the Act embodied a congressional intent "to C/}2., 
permit disqualification [for grants] not only for purposeful 
discrimination but also discrimination evidenced simply by an 
unjustified disparity in staff n s CA2 
flatly upheld HEW's basic view is the 
statutory standard. 
obligation to consider nonstatistical evidence. 
Jon's · Analysis 
As Jon notes, the case presents a straightforward ---~--
question of statutory interpretation. As he points out, 
subsection B (quoted above) clearly treats dismissal and 
demotion separately from hiring, promotion and assignment. 
Although th..i..s -€le~tent to treat "demotion and dismissal" 
A t,,,'2.--e,b!.a-,1-, 
differently from "hiring, promotion, and assignment 11 4 the 
language itself does not necessarily indicate the 
applicability s~dard for the latter category (teacher 
assignment, as involved in this case). 
Jon concludes, however, from the overall structure 
~/of the Act, that section 1602 - to the extent it incorporates 
~I a substantive legal rule - intends to employ the same legal 
' VJ~ 
1~ 
standard as used in Title VI. Compare §1602(a) and 1602(b). 
~~ 
In Bakke, this Court (Brennan and Powell) determined that 
Title VI incorporates the constitutional standard. Jon finds 






supports the inflexible disparate impact standard. 
Accordingly, he would reverse and remand the case 
to CA2 • 
4. 
The opinion of this Court should make clear, 
however, that CA2 is not free merely to affirm the district 
court on the ground that it had found HEW's findings of 
discriminatory intent to be based upon substantial evidence. 
Jon concludes that the HEW finding of discrimination was 
conclusory, and based substantially - if not solely - on 
....___ --, 
statistical evidence. Tts, HEW itself applied an erroneous 
standard. Therefore, the case ultimately should be remanded 
to HEW for decision on the proper standard. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: Board 
v. Harris, 
of Education 7-~73 of the City School District of New York 
i'{-
Petitioner's Reply Brief. Petr's have filed a reply 
brief to address the SG's interpretation of the meaning of the 
expression "engages 
. ,. 
1n discrimination" in 20 u.s.c. § 
I 
1605(d)(1)(B). 
First, petr argues that the plain language of the 
statute distinguishes between "disproportionate demotion and 
dismissal of staff members," and "discrimination." 20 U.S.C. § 
1605(d) ( 1) (B) provides: 
I 
No educational agency shall be eligible for 
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(B) had in effect any practice, policy, or 
procedure wh i ch results in the disproportionate 
demotion or dismissal of instructional or other 
personnel from minority groups in conjunction with 
desegregation or the implementation of any plan or the 
conduct of any activity described in this section, or 
otherwise engaged in discrimination based upon race, 
color, or national origin in the hiring, pro;notio~, or 
assignment or employees of the agency (or other 
personnel for whom the agency has any administrative 
responsibility). 
The SG argues that the word "otherwise" means "in the same 
manner as" or "similarly." Petr argues that the term is used in 
its normal sense to mean "in a different way or manner." 
Webster's Third International Disctionary (1961) (Unab.) Petr 
; 
says that the SG's interpretation could have been achieved 
simply by listing all of the practices in a single clause. The 
bifurcated structure indicates that "discrimination" cannot be 
proved simply by disproportionate effect. See also S. Rep. 92-61 
at 19 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971)(stating that the phrase 
"disproportionate demotion or dismissal" is not modified by the 
subsequent phrase "or otherwise engaged in discrimination.") 
Second, petr responds to the SG' s argument that the 
structure of 20 U.S.C. § 1605(d) ( 1) indicates that a disparate 
impact test is appropriate. In particular, petr argues that 
Subsection C, which provides that students may not be separated 
except by bona fide ability grouping, employs a good faith test. 
The remaining two subsections do not employ a disparate impact 
standard. See Bench Memorandum at 21-22. Accordingly, petr 
maintains that the general scheme of§ 1605(d)(1) demonstrates 
that focus on intent is the rule, not the exception. 
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Third, petr disputes the SG's reliance upon the 
language and legislative history of the Stennis Amendment, 20 
U.S.C. § 1602. Petr says that the explicit presence of "intent" 
standards in§ 1605(d) (1), such as Subsection D barring policies 
that limit extracurricular activities in order to avoid minority 
participation, demonstrates that§ 1602 could not be intended to 
apply a disparate impact test to all provisions of the Act. 
Furthermore, the Stennis Amendment does not employ the term 
"discrimination," which is the term to be interpreted in this 
case. 
I believe that 
Bench Memorandum 20-22. 
the ~tr' s arguments are correct. See 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-873 
Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City 
of New York et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Patricia Roberts Harris, Secre-
tary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. 
[October ~, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a narrow, but important, issue of statu-
tory interpretation. It concerns a school district's eligibility / 
for federal financial assistance under the 1972 Emergency 3 
School Aid Act (ESAA or the Act) , Pub. L. 92-~ 86 Stat. 
354, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1601-1619.1 Because the 
federal funds available under the Act are limited, educational 
agencies compete for those funds. 
I 
By§ 702 (a) of the Act, 86 Stat. 354, 20 U.S. C. § 1601 (a), 
Congress found "that the process of eliminating or preventing 
minority group isolation and improving the quality of educa-
1 The Act was technically repealed but then immediately re-enactrd, 
with amendments not material here, by Title VI of the Education Armnd-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2252, 2268, effective Sept. 30, 1979. 
The re-enactment is recodified as 20 U. S. C. §§ 319 1-3207. Because they 
govern this case and have been used throughout the litigation, the statu-
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tion for all children often involves the expenditure of addi-
tional funds to which local educational agencies do not have 
access." Accordingly, in § 702 (b). Congress stated that the 
purpose of the legislation was to provide financial assistance 
"to meet the special needs incident to the elimination of 
minority group segregation and discrimination among stu-
dents and faculty in elementary and secondary schools," to 
encourage "the voluntary elimination, reduction, or prevention 
of minority group isolation" in such schools, and to aid school-
children "in overcoming the educational disadvantages of 
minority group isolation." Section 703 pronounced as United 
· States policy that guidelines and criteria established pursuant 
to the Act should "be applied uniformly in all regions of the 
United States." And. by §106 (dJ'(l), an educational agency 
was expressly declared ineligible for assistance if, after the 
date of the Act (June 23, 1972) , it.,...anwng otheP thing~ 
" (B) had in effect any practice, policy, or procedure 
which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismis-
sal of instructional or other personnel from minority 
groups in conjunction with desegregation or the imple-
mentation of any plan or the conduct of any -activity 
described in this section. or otherwise engaged in dis-
crimination based upon race, color, or national origin in 
the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees of the 
agency." 2 
2 A school district found to be ineligible may apply for a waiver of its 
ineligibilit:v. §§ 706 (d) (I). (2) , and (3) . The statute's waiver provision 
authorize;,; the Secretary of the Department, of Health, Education, and 
Welfare to permit funding of an otberwise ineligible applicant if the 
applicant, specifies the reason for its ineligibility and submits "such in-
formation and assurances as the Secretary shall require by regulation in 
order to in:sure that any prn.ctice, policy, or procedure, or other activity 
J'€sulting in the ineligibility has cea,;ed to exi:st or occur and include[s] 
such provision,; as are neoes:;ary to insure that. such activitieo: do not reoc-
cur after the ~ubmission of the application." 
The waiver provision is not. involved in this case. A subsequent pro-
ceeding J?rovoked b~ the Secretary's denial of a waiver to petitioner Board 
- -
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The Act, in § 710 (a) , provides that an agency desiring to 
receive assistance for a fiscal year shall submit an application 
"at such time, in such form, and containing such information" 
as the Assistant Secretary for Education of the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) "shall require by 
regulation." The application is then reviewed by that office 
and is ranked according to criteria set out in § 710 (c), as 
implemented by regulation. See 45 CFR § 185.14 (1978). 
The essential first step is a determination 3 that the applicant 
is not ineligible under § 706 ( d) (1). This determination is 
made initially by HEW's Office for Civil Rights. The burden, 
presumably, is on the applicant to establish its eligibility. 
II 
Petitioner Board of Education of the City School District 
of the City of New York filed three applications for ESSA 
assistance for the fiscal year 1977-1978. Its revised Basic 
Grant Application, the only one now at issue, was given a 
sufficiently favorable ranking so as initially to be considered 
for funding in the amount of $3,559,132. On July 1, 1977, 
however, HEW by letter informed the Board that it did not 
meet the Act's eligibility requirements. App. 27. In line 
with the provisions of 45 CFR § 185.46 (b). an informal meet-
ing was held on July 22. Although HEW then withdrew 
some of its adverse findings, it still concluded that the Board 
had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for revocation of its 
determination of ineligibility. This, it was said. was because, 
in the language of 45 CFR § 185.43 (b) (2), the Board's "as-
signment of full-time classroom teachers to [its] schools [was] 
in such a manner as to identify [one or more} of such schools 
for the fiscal year 1978-1979 is pre,;ently pending on appeal before the 
United States Court of Appeab for the Second Circuit. See Brief for 
Petitioners 21, n. * ; Brief for Re:,;poudents 2, n. 2. 
3 "No application for assi:,;tance ... shall be approved prior to a deter-
mination by the Secretary that the applicant is not ineligible by reason 
of this subsection." § 706 ( d) ( 4). 
- -
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as intended for students of 'a particular race, color, or national 
origin." 
The ineligibility determination rested upon statistics de-
veloped by HEW's Office for Civil Rights during a 1976 com-
pliance investigation of the Board's school system under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000d et seq. From these statistics, HEW concluded that 
it was possible to identify a number of schools as intended for 
either minority or nonminority students, solely because of the 
composition of the faculties. The statistics revealed that, 
during the 1975-1976 school year, 62-.6% of high school pupils 
were members of a minority, but only 8.3% of high school 
teachers were minority-members. Further, 70 % of the minor-
ity high school teachers were assigned to schools at which 
the minority student enrollments exceeded 76 %. Conversely, 
in those high schools where minority student enrollments were 
·1ess than 40%, there was a disproportionately low percentage 
of minority teachers. App. 29, 42-43. 
The statistical study showed like patterns at the junior high 
and elementary levels. The percentage of minority junior 
high teachers was 16:7; and these teachers were concentrated in 
districts with the highest percentages of minority students. 
Id. , at 29. For the elementary schools, the citywide percent-
age of minority teachers was 14.3, and-these were placed primar-
ily in districts witli the largest minority student enrollments. 
Id., at· 28-29. HEW also relied upon prior findings made by 
it that' the Board was in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Act. 
At the informal meeting of .fuly 22, HEW limited its inquiry 
to the accuracy of the statistics upon which it had made its 
determinatio11 to deny funding._ No substantive rebuttal or 
explanation for the statistical disparities was presented. On 
September 16, 1977, HEW issued its formal opinion adhering 
to it,5 decision of July 1 to deny funding. Brief for Petitioners 
8. 
The present action then was promptly instituted in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
- -
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York to obtain declaratory relief, to enjoin HEW from en-
forcing its determin1>tion of ineligibility, and to award the 
initially earmarked funds to the Board! The complaint~ ~ contained no challenge to the a,,curacY or sufficiency 
~ of HE.w:s statistics. Rather. petitioner Board took the posi-
tion that the racially disproportionate teacher assignments re-
sulted from provisions of state law, from provisions of collec-
tive-bargaining agreements, from licensing requirements for 
particular teaching positions, from a consent decree relating 
to bilingual instruction (Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of 
Education, 72 Civ. 4002 (SDNY Aug. 29, 1974); see 65 
F . R. D. 541 (SDNY 1975)) , and from demographic changes 
in student population. Intentional or purposeful discrimi-
nation expressly was denied. App. 134-149. 
Initially, the District Court, after its review of the adminis-
trative record and after a hearing, denied the Board's motion 
summary judgment and granted HEW's cross-motion, 
thus affirming the denial of funding. The court s,,id : 
" [T]here was a reasonable basis for a decision that it had 
so discriminated. This Court's powers are extremely 
limited. In this respect, considering the high school 
statistics, the State statutes, the United Federation of 
Teachers agreements, the wishes of individual Black prin-
cipals, the desires of the individual Parent.-Teachers As-
sociations, community school board and Black and White 
communities, the Administrator could find a prMtice, 
policy or procedure after June 23. 1972, resulting in the 
identification of schools as intended for students of a par-
ticular race, color or national origin through the assign-
ment of teachers to those schools. 
• Alt bough tJ,e litigation wss instituted by P"titiouer ]3-0o,d (and its 
Ch• nc,llor) and by a numbe< o[ Community School Districts, only the 
Boa,d's ,eque,t for funds remains , ootested. See Brief for Petitionera 
8, n . *' ; Brief fo, n,,;pnnd.ents 3, n . 3; Reply B,ie[ for Petitioners 3, 
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"Accordingly, with the greatest reluctance because it 
is the children of the schools who will suffer from this de-
cision of the Administrator, the Court grants the Govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment." Id., at 69-70. 
The Board's request for reargument, however, was granted. 
The District Court then concluded that HEW should have 
considered the justifications proffered for the statistical dis-
parities. The matter was therefore remanded to HEW for 
further consideration consistent with an opinion the court 
issued. In that opin'ion, the court stated : 
"The relevant statute, regulations and cases indicate a 
failure of H. E. W. Before declaring a school board 
ineligible for ESAA funds, H. E.W. must find either that 
( 1) the school board was maintaining an illegally segre-
gated school system on June 23, 1972 and it took no 
effective steps to desegregate after that date or (2) it had 
a practice after June 23, 1972 that was segregative in in-
tent, design or foreseeable effect. It may rely on statis-
tics alone to make this finding, but it may not ignore 
evidence tending to rebut the inferences drawn from the 
statistics. . . . [T]he Constitution mandates that the 
plaintiffs must have an opportunity to rebut a statistical 
prima facie case of discrimination." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 102-104. 
After the administrative hearing on remand. HEW notified 
the Board that its explanation for the racially identifiable 
staffing patterns did not adequately rebut the prima facie evi-
dence of discrimination established by the statistics. This 
determination centered on disparities in 10 of the 110 second-
ary schools operated by the Board and serving predominantly 
nonminority student bodies. App. 109-110. HEW's letter 
of March 22, 1978, to the Chancellor discussed the several jus-
tifications offered and concluded that each was insufficient .. 
Id., at 102-114. 
- -
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The Board once again sought relief in the District Court.. 
On April 18, that court upheld HEW's finding of ineligibility 
as supported by substantial evidence, and denied relief. Id., 
at 150-153. The Board appealed and obtained a stay preserv-
ing the funds at issue pending appellate review. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 584 F. 2d 576 (CA2 1978) . 
On the appeal, the Board still did not contest the finding that 
certain of its schools were racially identifiable "as a result of 
the significant disparities in staff assignments." Id., at 585, 
The Board, instead, argued that HEW was required" to estab-
lish that the disparities resulted from purposeful or intentional 
discrimination in the constitutional sense." Ibid. The Court 
of Appeals rejected this contention. It held that Congress has 
the authority "to establish a higher standard, more protective 
of minority rights, than constitutional minimums require," 
and that "Congress intended to permit grant disqualification 
not only for purposeful discrimination but also for discrimina-
tion evidenced simply by an unjustified disparity in staff 
assignments." Id., at 588. It further concluded that HEW's 
denil'.l,l of funding was not arbitrary or capricious. Id., at 589, 
The several proffered justifications were either inadequate to 
explain the disparities or were unsupported by facts appearing 
on the record. Ibid. 
Because of the importance of the issue, we granted cer-
tiorari. 440 U. S. 905 ( 1979trf."' The stay preserving the 
fund~ remains in effect. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 41 (b) . 
III 
Our primary concern is with the intent of Congress. Sec-
t.ion 706 sets forth the eligibility criteria for ESAA funding. 
In subsection (a)(l) it authorizes a grant to a local educa-
tional agency that (i ) is implementing a desegregation plan 
approved by a court, or by HEW "as adequate under title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," or (ii) , "without having 
been required to do so," has a plan to eliminate or reduc~ 
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Critical to the resolution of the issue in this case, however, 
are the ineligibility provisions of § 706 ( d) ( 1) (B) , quoted 
above in pt. I of this opinion. Ineligibility comes about if 
the agency either has in effect a practice "which results in the 
disproportionate demotion or dismissal of . .. personnel from 
minority groups," or '1otherwise engage[s] in cliscrimina-
tion . .. in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees." 
~ mere reading of this language reveals that it suffers 
from imprecision of expression and less-than-careful drafts-
manship. The first portion clearly speaks in terms of effect 
or impact. The second portion. arguably, might be saicl to 
possess an overtone of intent. There is nothing specifically 
indicating that this difference exists or, if it does, that it was 
purposefully drawn by Congress. The existence and signifi-
cance of the difference ·are important for petitioner Board, for 
· we are conerned here not with "disproportionate demotion or 
dismissal of . . . personnel," but with racial "discrimination" 
in the "assignment of employees." 
The Board, as a consequence, argues that it was not the aim 
of Congress to permit HEW to find that an applicant was 
ineligible for funding because of its staff assignments unless 
those assignments were purposefully discriminatory and thus 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; it follows, says the Board, that disproportionate 
impact alone, without proof of purposeful discrimination, is 
insufficient. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 
U. S. 406 (1977); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Dev. -Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229 (1976) ; and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U. S. 
189 (1973) , are cited. The Board, in other words, would have 
us interpret the assignment clause as one imposing a consti-
tutional standard. It contends that the test under Title VI 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act also provides the measure under 
ESAA of disqualifying discrimination and of ineligibilty. It 
claims that HEW's finding of intentional discrimination 
- -
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-erroneously relied upon a foreseeability test, and that, even 
if such a test were applicable, the finding was based solely on 
statistical evidence of disparate impact and that such evidence 
is insufficient. 
Respondents, in their turn, preliminarily assert that it is 
unnecessary to argue about the correctness of HEW's finding on 
the administrative record, and that it is also unneces$ary to 
pursue the dictum of the Court of Appeals to the effect that 
Title VI condemns practices having a disparate racial impact, 
although no purposeful discrimination is shown. See 584 F. 
2d, at 589; but see Parent Assn. of Andrew Jackson _ High 
School v. Ambach, 598 F. 2d 705, 715-716 (CA2 1979). Re-
spondents argue that there is no place here for equivocation : 
under 45 CFR § 185.43 (b) (2) , an agency is ineligible for 
funding if it has assigned full-time teachers to schools "in such 
a manner as to identify any of such schools as intended for 
students of a particular race, color, or national origin." This, 
it is said, is an objective criterion. Respondents note that 
the Board's only argument is that on the record no finding 
properly could be made that the assignment patterns resulted 
from intentional or purposeful discrimination, and thus, unless 
the constitutional standard 'applies, the Board effectively has 
conceded that the denial of funds was permissible. For the 
respondents, then, the sole issue is whether the Act authorizes 
the withholding of funds when the applicant's faculty assign-
ments, although not shown to_ amount to purposeful racial 
discrimination violative of the Equal Protection C1'ause, are 
not justified by educational needs. 
IV 
Intent v. Impact. The denial of funds to the Board re-
sulted from a violation of HEW's regulation, that is, teacher 
assignments that served to identify certain schools racially. 
·This led to ineligibility irrespective of whether it was or 
was not the product of purposeful discrimination. The con~ 
!'.> -~ ;; 
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trovcrsY thus comes down to the question whet11Cf that inter-
pretation by regulation is consistent with the governing stat-
ute. While perh•P' it, might he pnssihlc to t1,corizc anc1 to 
pSJ'SC the language of § 7 06 ( d) ( 1) ( B) , as l,he Busrd so 
strongly urges. in such a way as to conclude that only im-
pact is sufficient !or ineligibility with respect to "demotion 
or dismissal." but, intent is necessary with respect to "assign-. 
ment ol employees," ,-e conclude that the wording of the 
statute is ainbiguous and requires us to look closely at the 
·structure and context of the statute and to review its legisla-
tive history. When we do this, we are impelled to a con-
clusion adverse to the Board's position here. We hold that 
impact or effect governs both prongs of the ineligibility pro-
vision of § 706 ( d) ( 1) (B). The overall structure of the Act, 
Congress' statements of purpose and pnlicy, the legislative 
history, and the text of § 706 ( d) ( 1) ( B) all point in the di-
rection of an impact test. A reading of the Act in its entirety indispu\,ibly deroon-
strat<eS that Congress was disturbed about minority segrega-
tion and isolation as such, de facto as well as de jure, and that, 
with respect to the former, it intended the limited funds it 
made available to be used as an enticement device to encour-
age voluntarY elimination of that kind of segregation. The 
Board acknowledges that the Act was conceived in part to 
provide "a financial impetus to de facto segregated systems 
to voluntSJ'ilY desegregate." Briel for Petitioners 22. 
'fhat it was effect, and not intent, that was dominant in 
. the congressional mind when ESAA was enacted is apparent 
from the specific findings set forth in § 702. Congress' con-
cern was stated expressly to be about "minority group isola,-
tion and unproving the quality of education for all children." 
The stated purpose of the legislation was the elimination of 
this isolation. The focus clearly is on actual e!leet, not on 
discriminatofY intent. Furthennore, the pronouncement of 
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uniformity with respect to "conditions of segregation by race" 
in the schools. All "guidelines and criteria," presumably in-
cluding those governing ineligibility. must "be applied uni-
formly." and "without regard to the origin or cause of such 
segregation ." This, too, looks to effect. not purpose. 
There can be no disagreement as to the underlying philos-
ophy of the Act. At the time of ESAA's passage. it was gen-
erally believed that the courts, when implementing the Con-
stitution. could not reach de facto segregation. See, e. g., 117 
Cong. Rec. 11519 (1971) (rem:arks of Sen. Mondale.) Con • 
gress . apparently, was not then in much of a mood to mandate 
a change in the status quo. The midground solution found 
and adopted was the enticement approach "to encourage the 
voluntary elimination, reduction. or prevention of minority 
group isolation," as § 702 (a) (2) of the Act recites. Thus. 
it wou'.d make uo sense to allow a grant to a school district 
that, although not violating the Constitution, was maintaining 
a de facto segregated system. To treat as ineligible only an 
applicant with a past or a conscious present intent to perpet-
uate racial isolation would defeat the stated objective of end-
ing de facto as well as de jure segregation. 
Other provisions of the Act indicate that an effect test is the 
Act's ru'.e , not its exception. Section 706 (d) (1 )(A) disquali-
fies an agency that transfers property or makes services avail-
able to a private school or system without first determining 
("knew or reasonably should have known' ' ) that the recipient 
does not discriminate. Here, plainly, ~gibility results from 
something other than invidious motive; the applicant is in-
e:igible even when it is merely negligent in failing to discover 
the character of the recipient's operations. Similarly, § 706 
(d)(l) (C) , which has to do with the assignment of children 
to particular classes within a school, provides for ineligibility 
whenever "any procedure .. . results in the separation of 
minority group from nonminority group children for a sub-
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where there is "bona fide ability grouping." These strike us 
as "effect," not "i11tent," provisions.5 
Close analysis of § 702 ( d) ( 1) ( B), the specific provision at 
issue, also convinces us that its focus is on impact, not intent. 
The Board concedes, almost inescapably, that with respect to c 
disproportionate demotion or dismissal of persotfel, Congress 
imposed only an objective or disparate impact test. Brief for 
Petitioners 25; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. We agree. Unless a 
solid reason for a distinction exists. one would expect that, for 
such closely connected statutory phrases, a like standard was 
to apply to assignment of employees. The presence of the 
word "otherwise" in the second portion of § 706 ( d )( 1 )( B) 
["or otherwise engaged in discrimination ... in the . .. assign-
ment of employees"], while perhaps not persuasive in itself 
alone, is not without significance. It lends weight to the argu-
ment that disparate impact is also the standard that controls 
assignment practices. 
We also find support for this interpretation in the report of 
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare concern-
ing the Emergency School Aid and Quality Integrated Educa-
tion Act of 1971, which was one of the proposed ESAA bills : 
"This clause [the one that later became § 706 (d)(l) 
(B) of ESSA] renders ineligible any local educational 
agency which discriminates in its employment practices, 
and specifici\}'y presumes one practice to be discrimina-
tory : the disproportionate demotion or dismissal of in-
structional or other personnel from minority groups in 
5 There is a definite exce]Jtion to thi::; pattern in § 706 ( d) ( 1) (D) . 
Thi8 is conceded by HEW. Brief for Re:spondent:s 16. In subsection (D) 
t he statute speaks of any practice "such as limiting curricular or extra-
curricular ac tivities ( or part icipa tion therein by children) in order to avoid 
t he J)art icipat ion of minority group children in such activities." This, 
clea rly, i::; language of intent and motive. But in t hi:; context a mere 
effect test would be out of place and mischievous, for it would automati-
cally condemn every admini::;trative decision not to offer a particular coun;e 
, or program, however benign or however dicta too by budgetary exigencies .. 
- -
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conjunction with desegregating its schools or establishing 
integrated schools." S. Rep. No. 91-61, p. 41 (1971) . 
The words "presumes one practice" are emphasized by the 
Board, however, and are claimed to indicate that the Senate 
Committee was making "a significant and conscious distinc-
tion between the language of the section which relates to 
\ 
'demotion or dismissal' and that which relates to 'hiring, pro-
_/ motion or assignment.'" Brief for Petitioners 26. 
~ possible significance of the quoted language is over-
come, we think, by another provision of the same Report : 
"For the purposes of this bill, disproportionate demotion 
or dismissal of instructional or other personnel is con-
sidered discriminatory and constitutes per se a violation 
of this provision, when it occurs in conjunction with 
desegregation, the establishment of an integrated school, 
or reducing, eliminating or preventing minority group 
isolation." Id., at 18-19. 
If Congress had intended to make a sharp distinction between 
the two phrases of what became§ 706 (d)(l)(B) , it would not 
have described disproportionate minority staff reduction as 
"per se" a violation of "this provision." Further, shortly 
after the excerpt relied upon by the Board, the report states: 
"The language used in that part of paragraph (1) which 
precedes clause (A) is designed to render local educational 
agencies ineligible if they cause to occur, or permit to 
exist, those activities described in clauses (A), (B), (C) , 
or (D) , as opposed to language which simply prohibits 
such activities." S. Rep. No. 92--61, at 41 (emphasis 
supplied,) 
This description cannot be squared with the Board's argument 
that disqualification on any ground except disproportionate 
minority staff reduction requires a showing of intent. 
The legislative history also is supportive of our interpreta- c 
'tion. Not without relevance is the emergenc~the so--
- -
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called "Stennis Amendment," now § 703 (a), that pronounced 
national policy. The concept of a nationally uniform stand-
ard was proposed by Senator Stennis of Mississippi in April 
1971 in the debate on the proposed Emergency School · Aid 
and Quality Integrated Education Act of 1971, S. 1557, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1971) . See 117 Cong. Rec. 11508-11520 
(1971). Proponents of the amendment -argued that school 
districts in the South were being forced to desegregate in order 
to receive .federal emergency assistance, while those elsewhere 
could continue to receive such assistance despite existing seg-
regation conditions.'; Opponents were concerned that the pro~ 
posed amendment might be read as cutting back on desegre-
gation efforts in States that had segregated their schools by 
law.7 The Stennis Amendment was adopted and was included 
6 "The Stennis amendment would provide that there be a. nat ional school 
policy applied equally to all States, lora.Jitie,;, regions, and sections of the 
United State,;. - The adoption_ of thi:s amendment would help to eliminate 
the use of the 'double standard ,' which ha,; re:sulted in the requirement~ 
for the integration of the public school ,; being given a very stringent ap-
plication in the South and a very lenient application ebewhere. 
"I h,ive never been able to understilt1d ·how a. 10-year-old colored stu-
dent in a. public school in Harlem, Watts, or South Chicago, i,; exprcted to 
look around and see nothing but. black faces in hi:s clas:sroom and say to 
himself : 'This kind of racial ,;rp,1,ration does not hurt mr because the State 
of Illinois does not have a law requiring me to attend all-black schools. 
I should not feel hurt by thi;: racial separation because it is the result of 
hou:;ing pattern,; that ju;;t accide1ifally developed.'" 117 Cong. Rec. 
11511-11512 (1971) (remarks of Sen,1tor Eastland) . 
See al,;o id., at 11508-11510 (remarks of Senator Stenni::;) . 
7 " What, worries me is thi:s: It could be argued, if this became law, that 
the Attorney Grneral and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
could be told, 'Do not seek a remedy against an instance where there is 
officiiil discrimination unles,; you can also teU me how you can uniformly 
find the same kind of remedy available to eliminate segregation which does 
not have an official basis.' 
"The way it reads, I believe that argument might be made. . . 
"I fear this amendment could be const rued as an endorsement of weakened 
· 1mforcement throughout t his Na.tion. The reason why .I oppose- it ... ·J;, 
- -
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in the final version of ESAA when it was enacted as Title VII 
of the Education Amendments of 1972. Senator Stennis 
summarized his proposal in the final debate.8 
This history of § 703 (a) indicates that the statute means 
exactly what it says : the same standard is to govern nation-
wide, and is to apply to de facto segregation as well as to 
de jure segregation. It suggests ineligibility rules that focus 
on actualities, 11ot on history, on consequences, not on intent.9 
The Board's reliance on a colloquy between Congressman 
Pucinski, ESAA's sponsor in the House, and Congressman 
Esch does not persuade us otherwise. Mr. Esch inquired 
whether "the Secretary [ will] be authorized to apply the 
holding in the Singleton case [Singleton v. Jackson lv'Iunicipal 
Separate School Dist., 419 F . 2d 1211 (CA5 1969) , rev'd i1; part 
oi1 other grounds sub nom. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish 
School Bd. , 396 U. S. 290 (1970) ]-which is that you have 
to have a perfect racial balance in the faculty in every single 
school in your district-as a condition or requirement for 
assistance under this program?" Mr. Pucinski's response 
thn,t I fear it will be read as a policy statement calling for a national 
policy of non-enforcement." Id., at 11517-11518 (remarks of Sen. 
Mondale). 
See al8o id., at 11516-11517 (remarks of Sen .• favits) . 
8 "That is what the conferees have done and that language speaks for 
itself. For the first time, if this conference report is adopted and the bill 
is signed into law, we will have a uniform natiornil policy in school deseg-
regation matters, North, Sot1tl1, Eaist, and West applied uniformly without 
regard to the origin or cause of such segregation. That is the Stennis 
amendment, purr and simple." 118 Cong. R ec. 18844 (1972) . 
9 Pet itioner Board acknowledges that for funding purposes, the distinc~ 
tion between de jure and de facto segregation was "ernsed" in ESAA. 
Brief for Petitioners 23, 32. But it would t ie this rrasure only to the 
eligibility standards of § 706 (a) (1) (court-ordered, HEW-approwd, or 
voluntary plan of desegregation) and not to t he ineligibility criteria of 
§ 706 (d). 
We do not so limit. or circumscribe t.he stat11te. Section 703 (a) applies 
:to all "guidelines and criteria." 
- -
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was : "The answer is absolutely not." 117 Cong. Rec. 39332 
(1971) . 
While it might be argued that this passing exchange inti-
mates some limit on HEW's ability to require complete elimi-
nation of de facto segregation as a condition of ESAA 
eligibility, we do not regard the regulation at issue here as 
4t all inconsistent with the colloquy, and we find no indication 
in the legislative history that any Member of Congress voted 
in favor of the amendment in reliance on an understanding 
that it would weaken the eligibility conditions. See Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, - U. S. -, - (1979) (slip op., 
pp. 34-38) . HEW, by its regulation, does not require facul-
ties to be in perfect racial balance. It prohibits only faculty 
assignments that make schools racial1y identifiable. That is a 
much narrower requirement. 
Finally, there is some significance in the fact that Congress 
was aware of HEW's existing regulation when ESAA was re-
enacted in 1978. See n. 1, supra. The House version in-
cluded a waiver-of-ineligibility provision to respond to com~ 
plaints about the application of the regulation to Los Angeles 
and New York City. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, pp. 95-96 
(1978). 10 The waiver provision was dropped in the Con-
ference Committee report. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-
1753, p. 286 (1978). It is of interest to note that the Presi-
dent of the American Federation of Teachers, as a witness, 
recommended to the Senate "that the ESAA be ref armed to 
require a finding of discrimination, not simply a numerical 
imbalance, before ESAA funds can be cut off." Education 
10 " In an attempt to deal with this problem, the Committee bill adopts 
an amendment making clear the school districts which are undertaking 
efforts to integrate their faculty but which have not yet fully achieved 
t hat. goal may nonethPless obtain a waiver of ineligibility. Presently, the 
Department of Health , Education, and Welfare is interpreting the law a:s 
requiring school districts to complete faculty integration before they can 
apply for funds. The purpo,;e of this amendment i,; to assist those school 
·districts while they are t rying to achieve that goal." 
- ·e 
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Amendments of 1977, Hearing on S. 1753 before the Subcom-
mittee on Education, Arts and Humanities of the Senate 
Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess .. 1275 
(1977) (emphasis added). No such change, however, was 
made. This strongly suggests that Congress acquiesced in 
HEW's interpretation of the statute. 
There is no force in the suggestion that a decis~on adverse 
to the Board here will serve to ha.rm or penalize • the very 
children who are the objects of the beneficial provisions of 
the Act. A ruling of ineligibility does not make the children 
who attend the New York City schools any worse off; it does 
serve to deny them benefits that in theory would make them 
better off. The funds competed for, however, are not wasted, 
for they are utilized, in any event, to benefit other similarly 
disadvantaged children. It is a matter of benefit, not of 
deprival, and it is a matter of selectivity. 
For these several reasons, we readily conclude that the dis-
criminatiou that disqualifies for funding under ESAA is not 
discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment sense. Dispro-'-
portionate impact in assignment of employees is sufficient to 
occasioll ineligibility. Specific intent to discriminate is not an 
imperative. There thus is no need here for the Court to be 
concerned with the issue whether Tit~e VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 incorporates the constitutional standard. See 
University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 
(1978). Consideration of that issue would be necessary only 
if there were a positive indication either in Title VI or in 
ESAA that the two Acts were intended to be coextensive. 
The Board stresses the fact that a desegregation plan ap-
proved by HEW as sufficient under Title VI is expressly said 
to satisfy the eligibility requirements of~ 706 (a). The ineli-
gibility provisions of § 706 (d) , however, contain additional 
requirements and there is no indication that mere compliance 
with Title VI satisfies them. Nor does the fact that a viola-
tion of Title VI makes a school system ineligible for ESAA 
funding mean that only a Title VI vio'.ation disqualifies, 
- -
78-873-0PINION 
18 BOARD OF EDUCATION, NEW YORK CITY v. HARRIS 
It does make sense to us that Congress might impose a 
stricter standard under ESAA than under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. A violation· of Title VI may result in a 
cutoff of all federal funds, and it is likely that Congress would 
wish this drastic result' only when the aiscrimination is inten-
tional. In contrast, only ESAA funds are rendered unavail-
able when an ESAA violation is found. And since ESAA 
funds are available for the furtherance of a plan to combat 
de facto segregation, a cutoff to the system that maintains 
segregated faculties seems entirely appropriate. The Board's 
proffered distinction between funding and eligibility, that is, 
that a de jure segregated system was to be required to de-
segregate in order to receive assistance, but a de facto system 
was not, contravenes the basic thrust of ESAA. We are not 
persuaded by the suggestions to the contrary in Board of Edu-
cation, Cincinnati v. HEW, 396 F. Supp. 203, 255 (SD Ohio 
1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 532 
F. 2d 1070 (CA6 1976), and in Bradley v. Milliken, 432 F. 
Supp. 885, 886-887 (ED Mich. 1977).11 
Proof of Impact. In light of the record in 
tailed comment as to proof ·is unnecessary. 
this case, de-
Clearly, the-
11 We find Robinson v. VoUert, 411 F. Supp. 461, 472-475 (SD Tex. 
Hl76), upon which the Board also reliei:;, clearly distinguishable. This 
case concerned an attempt by HEW to impose conditions upon the receipt 
of ESAA funds different from those imposed by a court over~eeing court-
ordered desegregation. A comt-ordered plan is deemed sufficient. under 
Title VI. Elementary amf Secondary Education Amendments of 1967, 
§ 112, 81 Sta.t. 787, 42 U.S. C. § 2000d-5. The court in Vollert reai:;:med 
tha.t a court-ordered plan also should be deemed in compliance with 
ESAA. While we do not pa,;s upon the issue, it may be that what con-
stitutes acceptable integration ii; the :same under both Title VI and ESAA, 
and that HEW may not require a remedy different from that impoi:;ed by 
a court. EYen so, that would not mean that what constitut.ei:; discrimina-
tion i;:; the same under both :statutes. ESAA wai:; an attempt by Congress 
to briug about the i:;ame remedy without regard to the cause of the prob-
lem, while Title VI may have been intended to remedy the problem only 
when it~ cause was intentional discrimination. 
- -
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statistical evidence flowing from the 1976 compliance investi-
gation speaks for itself, and establishes a prima facie case. 
See Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 
306-308 (1977) . The case, of course, is rebuttable, but the 
burden is on the party against whom the statistical case has 
been made. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 497-
498, and n. 19 (1977); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978). That burden could be carried by 
proof of error in the statistics, or by an "educational neces-
sity" showing, analogous to the ''business necessity" justifica-
tion applied under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., see, e. g., Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 329 (1977); Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 581-583 ( dissenting opinion). 
It is not carried by proof that the assignments resulted from 
requirements of st,ate law, collective-bargaining agreements or 
teacher preferences. And we agree with the Court of Appeals 
that none of the justifications that might satisfy the "educa-· 
tional necessity" test, such as the unequal distribution of li-
censes in certain areas, compliance with the provisions of the 
bilingual instruction consent decree, and demographic changes· 
in student population are supported by evidence in the record. 
V 
In sum, we hold that discriminatory impact is the standard 
by which ineligibility under ESAA is to be measured. irrespec-
ti ve of whether the discrimination relates to "demotion or dis-
missal of instructional or other personnel" or to "the hiring, 
promotion, or assignment of employees" ; that a prima facie 
case of discriminatory impact may be made by a proper statis-
tical study and, in fact, was so made here; and that the bur-
den of rebutting that case was on the Board and was not 
'Sustained. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 











To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-873, Board of Education v. Harris 
~ 
I have reviewed Mr. Justice Blackmun's circulated 
draft. For the most part, it simply repeats the arguments 
presented by the SG in his brief. Thus, the opinion relies 
heavily upon the Stennis Amendment, the structure of the 
ineligibility criteria, and legislative history. 
The opinion does not, however, adopt the extreme test 
proposed by the SG. 
A school district 
Instead, it adopts a variant on Title VII. 
is ineligible if statistics demonstrate a 
prima facie violation, and if the school distirct is unable to 






- - 2. 
For the most part, the flaws in the opinion mirror the 
flaws in the SG's argument. For example, the opinion relies 
upon the structure of the ineligibility critera even though one 
clearly demands a showing of intent, and another necessitates a 
showing of "negligience,"-- a state of mind seemingly 
incompatible with application of a disparate impact test. 
Saul Goodman, who has begun work on a draft dissent for 
Mr. Justice Stewart, and I have already discussed the problems 
with the opinion's use of a Title VII standard. The opinion 
uses the standard of section 703(a) (1) of Title VII which 
usually deals 









703(a)(2) employs the term "discrimination," it would seem to be 
a better model. 
must show he 
Under the disparate treatment test, a plaintiff 
was treated differently because of his race. 
Accordingly, the ultimate issue in a disparate treatment case is 
intent or motivation, whereas the focus in a disparate impact 
case is on the consequences of employer action. See Schlei & 
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law at 1153-55. 
The opinion thus interprets the term "discriminate" 
without reference to the meaning of the term in either Title VII 
or Title VI, the major civil rights statutes dealing with 
employment and education. The more reasonable interpretation is 
that Congress meant to use the term in a manner consistent with 
its usage elsewhere. I suspect that Mr. Justice Stewart's 
dissent will focus on these difficulties. 
- -
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Dear Harry: 
In accord with my vote at Conference, I will await 
the dissent. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Confernce 
~incerely, 
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CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
October 29, 1979 
Re: 78~876 -~Board of Education v. Harris 
Dear Harry: 
Except for the paragraph discussing "proof of 
impact" at pages 18-19, I am prepared to join your 
opinion. Since petitioner has not questioned in 
this Court the adequacy of the prima facie case--
assuming that impact is the right standard--or the 
lower courts' rejection of its justification, I do 
not believe we should express any opinion on these 
evidentiary questions. Perhaps a slight change merely 
describing the evidence and indicating that no question 
has been raised in the petition would take care of my 
problem. 
Mr. Ju$ttce Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
Respectfully, 
i,vl 
- -~tntt (!lourl af tlft ~~ ~htftg 
Jru~ J. QJ. 2llffe~, 
CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
October 30, 1979 
Re: No. 78-873, Board of Education, New 
York Citt v. Harris 
Dear Harry, 
I expect to circulate a dissenting 
opinion in due course. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
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Re: No. 78-873 - Board of Education of 
the City School District of the City 
of New York, et al., v. Patricia 
Roberts Harris, Secretary of HEW, 
et al. 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
/'1.~. 
I t:77 · 
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Mr. Justice Black.mun . 
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November 8, 1979 
RE: No. 78-873 Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York v. Harris 
Dear Harry: 
I am delighted to join your opinion for the Court in 
this case. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/') \ ·, 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: No. 78-873 - Board of Education v. Harris 
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that appear at _the end of the first paragraph of Part V 
of the fourth draft of the opinion. This is on page 20. ~, 
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Patricia Roberts Harris, Secre-
~ary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, et ali 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. 
??c~ 
[November -, 1979J ~
MR. JusTICE STEWART, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the Emergency School Aid Act of 
1972 (ESAA) 1 renders ineligible for ESAA funding any 
school district whose faculty assignment policies have resulted 
in racial disparities, even in the total absence of any evidence 
of intentional racial discrimination. I disagree. It is my 
view that a school district is ineligible to receive ESAA funds 
only if it has acted with a racially discriminatory motive or 
intent in its faculty assignment policies. 
Jr 
The controversy in this case turns on the proper construe.; 
t ion of § 706 ( d) ( 1 )( B) of ESSA, which provides : 
"No educational agency shall be eligible for assistance 
under this chapter if it has, after June 23, 1972-
1 20 U. S. C. §§ 1601- 1619. In 1978, Congress re-enacted ESAA with 
amendments not material here and recodified the statute at 20 U. S. C, 
§§ 3191-3207. See Education Amendments of 1978, Title VI , Pub. L. 
No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2252, 2268. The provi::;ion at i;:;sue here, former 
§ 706 (d)(l)(B), is now codified at 20 U. S. C. A. § 3196 (c)( l )(B) 
- -
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" (B) had in effect any practice, policy, or procedure 
which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismis-
sal of instructional or other personnel from minority 
groups in conjunction with desegregation or the imple-
mentation of any plan or the conduct of any activity 
described in this section, or otherwise engaged in dis-
crimination based upon race, color, or national origin in 
the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees of the 
agency . ... " (Emphasis added.) 
Since the only discriminatory activity alleged in this case in-
volves the assignment of teachers, the inquiry must focus 
on the second (italicized) clause of § 706 (d)(l)(B). The 
precise question is what Congress intended when it used the 
phrase "or otherwise engaged in discrimination." 
In deciding that question, the starting point is the language 
of the statute itself. See, e. g., Southeastern Community 
College v. Davis, 442 U. S. -, - (1979). That language, 
as the positions of the parties to this suit confirm, may be 
read in two different ways. The first, that urged by the 
respondent and endorsed by the Court, is that the ineligibility 
standard under the second clause of§ 706 (d) (1) (B) , like that 
under the first clause, turns solely on a finding of disparate 
racial impact. This reading is supported by the argument 
that the second clause, which renders ineligible for ESAA 
funding any school district "engaged in discrimination . . . 
in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees" is 
linked by the word "otherwise" to the first clause, which 
unambiguously contains a disparate impact standard. The 
argument thus is based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, 
construing the word "otherwise" to mean "in a similar man-
ner" or "similiarly." The second way to read the statute, 
that urged by the petitioner, is to find different ineligibility 
standards in the two clauses of § 706 ( d) ( 1) (B )-disparate 
(Supp . 1979). In the interest of consistency with the Court's opinion, al! 
statutory reference;:; herein are to t he original ;;;ta tutory and Code provi ,;ions ... 
- -
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impact alone under the first clause, and discriminatory motive 
or intent under the second. This reading of the statute is 
supported by the fact that although the first clause of § 706 
(d)(l)(B) is explicitly written in terms of disproportionate 
irnpaict, the second clause is framed in terms that, as the Court 
today perceives, "possess an overtone of intent." 2 Ante, at 
8. Since the meaning of § 706 (d)(l) (B) is thus concededly 
ambiguous, it is necessary to look beyond the statutory words 
in order to ascertain their meaning. 
II 
That inquiry may appropriately focus on whether the in-
tent of Congress can be determined from a consideratiQn of 
the legislative history of § 706 (d) (1) (B) itself, or of other 
provisions of ESAA.3 
~ The petitioner a.Jso arguPs that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not 
appropriatPly applied in t his context ina::;rnuch as the word "otherwise" is 
not preceded by an enumeration of a number of types of improper con-
duct , but rather by a single type of highly particularized conduct . See 
2A C. Sands, Statutes and St-ttutory Construction, § 47.17 ( 4th ed. 
1972). In this context , the petitioner argurs that the word "otherwise" 
conveys a sense not of similarity, but of contra:-<t: the section fir:;t de-
scribP::;, without rega rd to motive or intent, disproportionate demotions 
or dismissals; then, in apparent contrn8t to the first type of conduct, it 
de · , · · " cli8c rimination" in the hiring, promotion, or a8signment of staff . 
3 The respondent al:;,o on the '·genera l scheme" of ESAA for its 
reading of the ~cconcl clause of § 706 (cl) (1) (B) a,- incorporating no more 
than a <Jjj•po,;f iili.J~ct-rt iurligibilit~· stnuclarcl. Thi::; reli ance i,.: misplaced. 
Alt hough one of tho couc~rns of Congrp,,;,; in en,u:ting ESAA was to rlim-
inate minority i,;olation regardless of its cau,;e, Congre,;s abo had in 
mind other important objectives in enacting the legislation. One such 
objective was to meet, the specia.1 edu cational needs of minority group 
children from environment:;: in which the dominant language is other than 
English. See S. Rep. Ko. 92-61, pp. 22-24 (1971). To attain this o~ 
jective, Congrf'BS ea rmarked cert,.1i n 11.'SAA funds for programs to assist 
t hese children in developing linguistic skills in both English and the 
language they spea.k at home. Section 708 (c) of ESAA, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1607. 
The re::;ponclent'::; construction of § 706 (cl) (1) (B), if li terally applied, 
- -
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'E. 
The legislative history of the specific provision in issue 
reveals that the language that ultimately was enacted in 
§ 706 (d) (1) (B) first appeared in S. 1557, a bill reported out 
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 
1971. In explaining the language at issue here, the Com-
mittee noted: 
"The phrase 'disproportionate demotion or dismissal of 
instructional or other personnel from minority groups' 
is not modified or in any way diminished by the subse-
quent phrase 'or otherwise engaged in discrimination 
based upon race, color or national origin.' which renders 
ineligible 1ocal educational agencies which have engaged 
in other discrimination , including discrimination in hiring, 
against minority group employees." S. Rep. No. 92-61, 
p. 19 (1971) (emphasis added). 
It is thus apparent that the Senate Committee that drafted 
the language now appearing in § 706 (d)(l) (B) not only 
recognized a distinction between the ineligibility standards 
under the first and second clauses, but also regarded the 
standard of ineligibility under the first clause as more burden-
some to the app1icant than the standard under the second 
clause. 
could wholly frustrate this congressional purpose b~, making ineligible-
for ESAA funds those school districts whosr faculty a,.os ignmrnt policies 
have cam,ed racial di,;paraties re~ulting from bona fide dfort,; to meet the 
special education needs of non-Engli1:,h-speaking childrrn. In a 1:,ituat ion 
where, for exnmple, a school clistrict i,; mnking special efforb to providc-
bilingua.l instruction to Spani ,;h-speaking children, it would be hardly 
surpri,;ing to find a, disproportionate number of Hispanic tea.chers assigned 
to schools serving Hi,;pa.nic ,;tu dents. Y ct, if the disparate impact test 
were literally applied , this bona fide nttcmpt to advance the goals of 
ESAA would render thr school di1:,trict ineligible for further ESAA 
funding . It can hardly be said, therefore, that the ornrall purposes of 
ESAA unerringly point to the respondent's reading of the second clause-
of § 706 (d) (1) (B). 
- -
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The purpose of this differentiation is also made clear in the 
legislative history. Congress singled out staff demotions and 
dismissals as appropriate for a disparate impact standard be-
cause it was well documented that desegregation activities 
had in some States resulted in the wholesale firing of Negro 
faculty members: "HEW statistics indicate that between 1968 
and 1970, in the States within the Fifth Judicial Circuit alone, 
the number of black teachers was reduced by 1,072, while 
the number of white teachers increased by 5,575." Id., at 18. 
These statistics so disturbed Congress that it adopted a per se 
rule of ineligibility for disproportionate demotions or dis-
missals of Negro faculty members in conjunction with de-
segregation activities, even at the cost of withholding ESAA 
funds from school districts that had in no way intentionally 
discriminated against Negro faculty members. 
The legislative history of § 706 (d)(I)(B) thus strongly 
suggests that the petitioner has advanced the proper inter-
pretation of the statute. This reading of § 706 (d)(I)(B), 
under which the first clause is governed by disparate impact 
and the second by motive or intent, is consistBnt with the 
fact tha.t Congress not only recognized a distinction between 
the ineligibility standards under the first and second clauses, 
but also regarded the standard of ineligibility under the first 
clause as more burdensome to the applicant than the standard 
under the second. · 
Apparently recognizing that the legislative history cannot 
support a reading of § 706 (d)(I)(B) that gives the same 
meaning to the ineligibility standards under its first and 
second clauses, the Court observes : 
"If there is a distinction between the two phrases, 
however, it is not inconsistent with the general impact 
orientation of§ 706 (d) ( I) (B). For the impact approach 
itself embraces at least two separate standards: a rebut-
table disparate impact test and a stricter irrebuttable dis-
proportionate impact test. To the extent that the "de-. 
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motion or dismissal" clause sets a higher standard for 
school boards to meet, it corresponds to the irrebutable 
impact test." Ante, at 13. 
To draw this distinction between the two clauses is, how-
ever, totally at odds with the Court's earlier endorsement of 
the respondent's re,ading of the language of the provision. 
That reading depends wholly on the proposition that inas-
much as the firs~ clause describes disparate impact, the pres-
ence of the word "otherwise" in the second clause "lends 
weight to the argument that disparate impact ·is also the 
standard [of ineligibility under the second clause]." Ante, 
at 12. It should follow that the standard contained in both 
clauses is the same-that the second clause incorporates the 
.irrebuttable disparate impact standard embodied in the first. 
The Court's contrary suggestion that an irrebuttable standard 
is contained in the first clause, but -only a rebut table standard 
in the second, is nowhere in the Court's opinion squared with 
the Court's express agTeement with the respondent's reading 
of the language of§ 70-6 (d) (1) (B) .4. 
4 Yet anot.her problem with the Court 's conclusion that tlie second 
clause of § 706 (d) (1) (B) creates a rebut.table disparate impact standard 
is the fact that the Court never explains it;, later suggestion that an appli-
cant may rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination only by proof of 
error in the ;;tat istics or by "'an educat ional nece.,;sity' ;;bowing, analogous 
to the 'business necessity' justification applied under Title VII of the 
Civi l Rightl'l Act of 1964." Ante, at 19. 
By referriug to the " business necrssity" justification under Title VII, the 
Court nppareutly is construing the term "discrimination " in § 706 (d) (1) 
(B) by reference to those cases under Title VII which have not required a 
showing of dit'rriminatory intent on the part of the employer, e. g., 
Gi·iggs Y. Duke Potcer Co., 401 U. S. 424. Under the doct rine of those 
ca:;es, a Title VII violation may be found if the plaintiff demonstrates that 
an employmrnt pmctice has a disparate racial impact and the employer-
is then unable to justify the practice on t he grot111ds of '· bu:siness neces-
sity." Id., at, 431-432. By analogy to this type of employment dis-
crimim.tion, the Court apparently concludes that, the second clause of 
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The fact of the matter is that the legislative history simply 
belies the respondent's reading of the statutory language. 
That history str<ti1Jy supports the conclusion that, while 
the first clause of§ 706 (d) (1) (B) incorporates a disparate 
impact standard, the second clause makes ineligibility depend 
upon discriminatory motive or intent. 
B 
The other provisions of ESAA, and particularly the so-
ment policies have a disparate racial impact not justified by educational 
needs. 
It is my view, however, that this category of Title VII cases has no 
bearing on the meaning of the tenn "discrimination" in the second clause 
of § 706 (d) (1) (B). Our cases make clear that the theory of "disparate 
impact" under Title VII is a gloss on the specific statu tory language of 
§§ 703 (a) (2) and 703 (h) of Title VII, see General, Electric Co . v. Gil-
bert, 429 U. S. 125, 137, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 425 U. S. 425, 
n. 21, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, at 426, n. 1. Under§ 703 (a) (2) , 
it is an unla,wful employment practice for a.n employer 
" to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way whicl1 would deprive or t end t-0 deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or ot,herwise adversely aifect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin," 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) . 
Section 703 (h) provides that it is not unlawful for an employer 
"to give and to ~wt upon t he restil ts of any professionally developed 
ability test provided that such te~t, its administration or action upon the 
results is not designated, intended or used to discriminate because of race, 
color, religion , sex, or national origin," 42 U. S. C. § 2000e--2 (h) . 
The language of these provisions qui te plainly does not t rack that in 
§ 706 (d) (1) (B) , for § 703 (a ) (2) fails even to include the term "dis-
crimination," and while the term does appear in § 703 (h) , it is expressly 
modified, "used to discriminate," in such a manner as to incorporate a 
disparate impact test. Since the language of §§ 703 (,l) (2) and 703 (h) 
of Title VII in no way resembles that at issue here, those provisions are 
obviously not an appropriate guide to the defini tion of "discrimination" 
under § 706 (d) (1 ) (B) . 
If there is an appropriate analogy to Title VII, it is a qui te different 
one. See Part III of thi,; dissenting opinion, infra, 
- -
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called Stennis Amendment, do not, it seems to me, support 
the weight the Court places upon them.5 
The Stennis Amendment, enacted as § 703 of ESAA 
provides : 
" (a) It is the policy of the United States that guide-
lines and criteria established pursuant to [ESAA] shall 
be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States 
in dealing with conditions of segregation by race in the 
schools of the local educational agencies of any State 
without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation. 
" (b) It is the policy of the United States that guide-
lines and criteria established pursuant to title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . .. shall be applied uniformly 
in all regions of the United States in dealing with con-
ditions of segregation by race whether de jure or de 
facto in the schools of the local educational agencies of 
any State without regard to the origin or cause of such 
segregation." 
The Court concludes that the Stennis Amendment and its 
legislative history "indicate that the statute means exactly 
what it says: the same standard is to govern nationwide, and 
is to apply to de facto segregation as well as de jure segrega-
t ion. It suggests ineligibility rules that focus on actualities, 
not on history, on consequences, not on intent." Ante, at 15. 
5 The Court also finds support fo r its reading of§ 706 (d ) (1 ) (B) in the 
fact that at least two of the three other ineligibilit.y provisions in § 706 
(cl) (1) do not require a showing of intent . Accordingly, the Court noteil 
that, "an effect test is the Act's rule, not it;:; except ion." Ante, at 11. 
Even putting aside donbti5 as to the validity of the premise of this 
argument (namely, that a statutory provision should be construed in 
accordance with the majori ty of arguably rela ted provisions) , t he Court's 
tally of these other provisions is extremely questionable. In ;:;hort, it 
seems clear that the ineligibility ;:;tandard of § 706 (d ) (I) (A) does not, as 
the Court suggests , amount to an "effect" test. That provision by its 
own terms rather plainly reqnires at least, a showing of negligence before 
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My difficulty with this reasoning stems from the fact that 
the Stennis Amendment is applicable not only to ESAA, but 
also to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the latter 
has been construed to contain not a mere disparate impact 
standard, but a standard of intentional discrimination. In 
University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 
five Members of the Court concluded that Title VI, which 
prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs, pro-
hibits only discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment 
and the Equal Pro-tection Clause of the Fourteenth. Id., at 
281-287 (POWELL, J.); id., at 328-355 (BRENNAN, J., joined 
by WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLAeKMUN, JJ.). Those consti .. 
tutional provisions, in turn, have been construed to reach only 
purposeful discrimination . Dayton Board of Education v. 
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406; Arlington Heiqhts v. Metropolitan 
Housing Dev. Corp ., 429 U. S. 252; Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229; Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo-
rado, 413 U. S. 189. It thus follows from Bakke that Title 
VI prohibits only purposeful discrimination. 
It is wholly incongruous to hold in this case that the Stennis 
Amendment supports a mere "disparate impact" reading of 
the term "discrimination" in§ 706 (d)(I)(B) of ESAA, when 
only two Tenns ago five Members of the Court construed the 
prohibition against "discrimination" in federally funded pro-
grams under Title VI, which is equally subject to the Stennis 
Amendment, to incorporate a purposeful discrimination test. 
If Congress in fact intended the Stennis Amendment to es-
tablish a uniform national standard prohibiting action leading 
to disparate racial impact, then it is difficult to understand 
why this standard should not govern Title VI as well as 
§ 706 (d) ( I) (B) . 
III 
The conclusion that ineligibility under the second clause of 
§ 706 (d)(I)(B) depends upon a showing of a school dis-
trict's purposeful discrimination is persuasively supported by 
- -
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the interpretations that have been given to analogous pro-
visions of Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. When Congress enacted ESAA in 1972, it was not 
writing on a clean slate. To the contrary, when Congress 
left undefined the term "discrimination" in the second clause 
of § 706 (d)( l)(B) , it had already enacted both Title VI of 
the 1964 Act, which provides that "no person . . . shall . .• 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance," 6 and § 703 (a) ( 1) of 
Title VII of that Act, which provides that it is unlawful for 
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any in-
dividual, or otherwise t.o discriminate against any indi-
vidual ... because of such individual's race color, religion, 
sex or national origin." 7 These provisions are, in the absence 
of any explicit definition of "discrimination" in ESAA or its 
legislative history, a useful guide in determining what Con-
gress intended when it concluded that school districts "en-
gaged in discrimination" should be ineligible to receive ESAA 
funds. 
Title VI and § 703 (a) (1) of Title VII point clearly to-
ward the necessity of finding discriminatory motive or intent 
in order to hold a school district ineligible under the second 
clause of § 706 (d)(l)(B) .8 Title VI, as already pointed out, 
has been construed to prohibit only discrimination violative 
of the Fifth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth , University of California R egents v. Bakke, 
438 U. S. 265, 281-287 (POWELL, J. ) ; id. , at 328-355 (BREN-
NAN, J. , joined by WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.), 
and, in turn, those constitutional provisions have been con-
6 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (1976) (emphasis added). 
7 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1976) (emphasis added). 
8 There may be a difference bet.ween t he s tandard of T itle VI and that 
of § 703 (a) (1) of Title VII. But it is clear that a finding of discrimina-
t ion under either provision ul timately depends upon a finding of either· 
discriminatory motive or discriminatory intent. 
- -
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;:;trued to prohibit only purposeful discrimination, Dayton 
Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 
TJ. S. 252; Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229; Keyes v. 
School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189. And, in 
construing § '703 (a) (1) of Title VII, which, at its core, pro-
hibits an employer from "treat[ing] some people less favor-
ably than others because of their race, color, religion , sex, or 
national origin," Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 
335, n. 15, we have held that "[p]roof of discriminatory 
motive is critical," ibid. Accord, Furnco Construction Corp. 
v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 579-580; McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U. S. 79~, 805, n. 18.0 
If the term "discrimination" in § 706 (d) (1) (B) was in 
fact intended to mean something other than what it means 
under Title VI and § 703 (a)(l) of Title VII, Congress could 
have been expected to state the difference in explicit terms. 
Since there is no such expression of congressional intent, it 
follows that the meaning of the term "discrimination" under 
§ 706 (d)(l)(B) should be no different from its established 
meaning under Title VI and § 703 (a) (1) of Title VII.1° 
9 Because direct proof of an illicit motive is often unavailable, the 
cases under § 703 (a) (1) have establi:;hed a procedural mechanism under 
which an employer, once an employee has adduced sufficient evidence to 
give rise to an inference of a discriminatory motive, must bear the burden 
of establishing that he acted for "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason." 
If the employer meets that burden, then the employee must show that 
t he proffered explaJ1ation is in fact a pretext. Furnco Construction Corp . 
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-577; T eamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 357-360; McDonnell Doug/,as Corp . v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800---805. 
This procedural mechani:;m is simply de:signed to provide a means of 
inferring an employer's motive in the absence of direct evidence. See 
Furnco Constmction Corp . v. ·waters, supra. 
10 The Court finds :support. for its interpretation of § 706 (cl) (1) (B) in 
the fact that Congre,,s, though awa.re that HEW had const rned the sec-
tion to incorpora.te a disparate impact te:;t , re-enacted it without. change 
ju 1978. Ante, at 16-17. This inaction by Congress, in the Court's view, 
- -
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For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
"strongly suggests that Congress acquiesced in HEW's interpretation of 
the statute." Id. , at 17. 
This argument might have force if the Court today constrned § 706 (d) 
(1) (B) the way HEW interpreted it in 1978. But the Court has not 
done so. The HEW regulation implementing § 706 (d) (1) (B) provides, 
as it did in 1978, that: 
"No educational agency shall be eligible for assistance under the Act if, 
after June 23, 1972, it has had or maintained in effect any other practice, 
policy, or procedure which results in discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, or national origin in the recruiting, hiring promotion, payment, 
demotion, dismissal, or assignment of any of its employees .. . , including 
the assignment of fulltime classroom teachers to the schools of such 
agency in such a manner as to identify any of such schools as intended 
for students of a particular race, color, or national origin.'' 45 CFR 
§ 185.43 (b)(2) . 
By lumping together "demotions and dismissals," on the one hand, with 
employee "assignments," on the other, the HEW regulation rather clearly 
equates the ineligibility standard of the second clause of the § 706 (d) (1) 
(B) with the irrebuttablc disparate impact standard of the first clause. 
By contrast, the Court. ,mys that the ineligibility standards under the two 
clauses substantially differ. Ante. pp. 13-14. Since the Court departs 
from HEW'i:; 1978 interpretation of § 706 (d) (1) (B), it is hard to see 
how the failure of Congress to overturn that interpretation lends support 
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